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State v. United States Steel Corp.6/24/1996
t's version of section 552. See, e.g., Guaranty Bank and Trust Company v. Reyna, 51 Ill. App. 2d 412, 201 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964); Citizens Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Fischer, 67 Ill. App. 2d 315, 214 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966); Penrod, 385 N.E.2d at 381.
Nor have the Illinois decisions since Penrod and Moorman offered any analysis of the "in the business of supplying information" requirement, or questioned the continuing efficacy of the requirement in view of the advent of the Second Restatement's version of section 552. Representative of these decisions is Black, Jackson & Simmons Ins. Brokerage, Inc. v. International Business Machines Corp., 109 Ill. App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 282, 64 Ill. Dec. 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), where the court held:
Moorman. . . enumerates certain exceptions to the general rule prohibiting recovery of economic losses in tort, and it is one of these exceptions which forms the basis for the plaintiff's argument on appeal. The Moorman court stated that "economic loss is recoverable where one intentionally makes false representations ( Soules v. General Motors Corp. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 282, 37 Ill. Dec. 597, 402 N.E.2d 599) and where one who is in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business transactions makes negligent representations ( Rozny v. Marnul (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656)." ( Moorman at 88-89, 61 Ill. Dec. 746, 435 N.E.2d at 452.) The plaintiff argues that its cause of action is based upon negligent misrepresentation and therefore falls within the second above-quoted exception to the Moorman rule.
In addressing the merits of this argument, it is helpful to examine the situations in which Illinois law has been considered concerning recovery of economic losses in a tort action. For the most part, the cases have relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552 which is entitled "Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others." [(Quoting the Second Restatement's version of section 552.)]
Id. at 283-84 (underlined emphases in original, bold emphasis added, and some citations omitted). Neither rationale, therefore, whether based on Moorman or Penrod, is particularly compelling, and we decline to apply them to our interpretation of section 552.
iii. section 552 reaches suppliers of information whose information affects transactions to which they are parties, as well as suppliers of information whose information affects others' transactions with third parties
Finally, although the rationale utilized by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in its National Can decision, cited in Penrod, that section 552 applies only "in situations where information was supplied that damaged a plaintiff in its relations with third parties [,]" 505 F. Supp. at 150 (emphasis in original), is differently worded than the rationale utilized by the Illinois state courts, it is equally flawed.
The National Can decision provides in pertinent part:
National Can seeks to escape the force of this uniform body of law [i.e. the economic loss rule] by characterizing its claim as one under the tort of negligent misrepresentation, recognized in Rozny v. Marnul, . . . and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. If the Court may be pardoned a bad pun, National Can is seeking to put new wine into old bottles.
Restatement § 552, as well as the Illinois case law National Can seeks to rely on, deals with an essentially different kind of situation from that involved here. Section 552 imposes liability for detrimental reliance upon "one who in the course of his business or profession supplies informatio
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