State v. United States Steel Corp.6/24/1996
n for the guidance of others in their business transactions." That tort has been recognized almost exclusively in situations where information was supplied that damaged a plaintiff in its relations with third parties, see Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 464 (1965).
505 F. Supp. at 150 (emphasis in original). This rationale, however, is directly controverted by illustration 4 to section 552, which provides that:
A, having lots for sale, negligently supplies misinformation concerning the lots to a real estate board, for the purpose of having the information incorporated in the board's multiple listing of available lots, which is distributed by the board to approximately 1,000 prospective purchasers of land each month. The listing is sent by the board to B, and in reliance upon the misinformation B purchases one of A's lots and in consequence suffers pecuniary loss. A is subject to liability to B.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, comment on subsection (2), illustration 4 (1977). As is evident from the illustration, wherein A is liable to B, section 552 was intended to apply to direct transactions between sellers and purchasers as well as those involving third parties. Although it may be true that the bulk of decisions stem from factual situations involving damage stemming from a recipient of information's transactions with third parties other than the provider of information, this alone does not compel a narrow reading of section 552 that limits its applicability solely to such situations or precludes its applicability to providers of information who make misrepresentations to parties to transactions in which the providers of information are involved.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 552 is not limited solely to: (1) suppliers of information who are in the business of supplying information; and (2) situations involving damage stemming from a recipient of information's transactions with third parties other than the provider of information.
2. The Jury Instructions
The state raises three points of error regarding the trial court's instructions to the jury. The state asserts that the trial court erroneously: (1) instructed the jury regarding the definition of "unfair" and "deceptive" acts or practices associated with its claim based on HRS chapter 480; (2) declined to give its instruction regarding the absence of a privity requirement associated with a HRS chapter 480 claim; and (3) gave an unqualified instruction indicating that "sellers may promote the quality of their goods." We discuss each in turn.
a. Standard of Review
It is well settled that:
When jury instructions, or the omission thereof, are at issue on appeal, "the standard of review is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent or misleading." Myers v. South Seas Corp., 76 Haw. 161, 164, 871 P.2d 1231, 1234, reconsideration granted in part, denied in part, 76 Haw. 353, 877 P.2d 890 (1994) (quoting State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 514-15, 849 P.2d 58, 74 (1993). See also Montalvo v. Lapez, 77 Haw. 282, 286, 884 P.2d 345, 349, ("Jury instructions . . . must be considered as a whole. Moreover, a refusal to give an instruction that correctly states the law is not error if another expressing a substantially similar principle is given.") (quoting State v. Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd., 64 Haw. 168, 180, 637 P.2d 1131,
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