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State v. Roper6/19/1996
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{2} Defendant and a passenger were involved in a vehicular accident. Defendant lost control of his motorcycle when he hit either a pothole or a patch of gravel. Both he and the passenger sustained injuries requiring medical attention. A police officer questioned Defendant at the hospital. The officer testified not only that he smelled alcohol on Defendant's breath and that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes, but also that Defendant admitted he had consumed two beers and had been speeding at the time of the accident. At some point, either before or after (or both before and after) the officer arrested Defendant, the officer asked Defendant if he would take a blood-alcohol test . Defendant refused.
{3} After Defendant had been treated for his injuries, the officer asked one of the nurses in the emergency room about the blood-alcohol content of the blood test taken by the hospital in the course of diagnosing and treating Defendant. The nurse stated that the tests showed Defendant's blood-alcohol content to be .104. The State later subpoenaed the medical records. Defendant was eventually charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (Repl. Pamp. 1994), and with causing great bodily injury while driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-101(B), (C) (Repl. Pamp. 1994), among other infractions. After arguments before the trial court on Defendant's motion to quash the grand jury indictment and motion to suppress the results of the hospital's blood test, the trial court concluded that, although the officer had probable cause to arrest Defendant, the results of the test constituted a privileged confidential communication between a physician and a patient under SCRA 11-504. The trial court thus suppressed the test results.
II. DISCUSSION
{4} The material facts are not at issue, and the only dispute arises from the application of SCRA 11-504 and the law to the facts. We therefore review de novo. See .
{5} SCRA 11-504(B) states:
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his physician or psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
{6} Common law did not recognize the physician-patient privilege. ), cert. denied, 101 N.M. 362, 683 P.2d 44 (1984). Consequently, the privilege is in derogation of the common law and must be construed strictly against the asserting party. State v. Boysaw, 40 Ohio App. 3d 173, 532 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). The purpose of the privilege is to encourage a patient to make complete disclosures of his symptoms and conditions to a physician without fear of publication. Id. ; see also 3 Spencer A. Gard, Jones on Evidence § 21:24 (6th ed. 1972). "'The value placed on privacy, manifested both by general concerns for privacy and by the specific concerns for an individual's bodily integrity found in constitutional, statutory, and common law doctrines, suggests a strong policy basis' for the privilege." Dillenbeck v. Hess, 73 N.Y.2d 278, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1131, 539 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting Developments in the Law, Medical and Counseling Privileges, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1530, 1548 (1985)). SCRA 11-504 does not contain any language limiting its application to civil cases. We therefore hold that the privilege applies to all cas
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