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City of Lovington v. Tyson6/5/1996 m by over 1,000 percent. See ) (this Court will not interpret a statute or other legislative action in a way that will produce an absurd result), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 545, 854 P.2d 872 (1993).
{7} In the alternative, our calendar notice proposed to construe the omission of the phrase "of one percent" following "eight hundredths" as an inadvertent omission. We pointed out that in interpreting a statute, this Court may add words to the statute to carry out the evident legislative intent or to express the clearly manifested meaning of that statute. ); see also ) (changing word "employer" in statute to "worker" to carry out obvious intent of legislature), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 430, 882 P.2d 21 (1994).
{8} In response to the calendar notice, Defendant argues that the words of the statute are clear, even if the legislature might have erred in using those words. He contends that we are bound to apply the statute as written. We disagree. Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give force to the legislature's intent. . The legislature's obvious intent in amending the statute was to lower the allowable level of alcohol in a driver's blood, not to increase it to a level that would kill the driver several times over. The phrase "eight hundredths," without any following reference point, is sufficiently ambiguous to require interpretation, especially given the subject matter here -- intoxilyzer readings and blood alcohol levels, which as we have noted are often expressed in terms of hundredths without specifying that the reference is to hundredths of one percent. In addition, as we noted above, even if we were required to add the phrase "of one percent" to the statute to effectuate the legislature's intentions, we may do so in rare and extreme, but appropriate, circumstances.
{9} Given the fact that Defendant's construction of the statute would lead to an absurd result, we construe the statute as referring to the readings obtained from an intoxilyzer machine or a blood test. Any reading or result higher than .08, or eight hundredths, will result in a violation of Section 66-8-102(C).
{10} Pursuant to the foregoing, we reverse Defendant's aggravated DWI conviction, but remand for entry of a conviction and sentence for DWI.
{11} IT IS SO ORDERED.
MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
WE CONCUR:
RUDY S. APODACA, Chief Judge
RICHARD C. BOSSON, Judge
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