Cavaliere v. Town of North Beach9/2/1994
Opinion by Wilner, C.J.
The issue before us in this appeal is whether a State or local police officer who seizes a motor vehicle under the authority of Md. Code art. 27, § 297 may, instead of proceeding with a forfeiture action under that statute, defer to a Federal forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881.
That issue, involving money rather than a vehicle, was probably before us once before, in State v. Walls, 90 Md. App. 300, 600 A.2d 1165 (1992), but, because of the extremely poor manner in which that case proceeded and was presented at both the trial and appellate levels (we characterized it at 303 as a "nightmare of procedural missteps and errors by everyone involved"), we did not appreciate the issue and therefore
gave it scant attention. We shall address it fully now, and our answer, under the circumstances of this case, is "yes." We therefore shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Calvert County.
Underlying Facts; Adoptive Seizures
The relevant facts here are not in dispute. In the early morning hours of May 14, 1992, Jason Leavitt, a police officer employed by the town of North Beach, in Calvert County, stopped appellant for erratic driving. After conducting certain field sobriety tests, Officer Leavitt arrested her for driving while intoxicated and transported her to a nearby State Police barrack. Her car was towed to the town garage. At the barrack, police discovered in appellant's purse four packets of cocaine weighing approximately 4 1/2 grams. As a result, appellant was charged not only with DWI but also with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine.
At that point, the town police could have set in motion the procedure established by State law, in art. 27, § 297, for the forfeiture of appellant's car. That would have required, among other things, (1) a formal determination by the chief law enforcement officer of the town that forfeiture was warranted under the standards set forth in § 297(i), (2) a written recommendation by that officer to the Town Council -- the town's legislative body, (3) an independent determination by the Council, using the same standards, that forfeiture was warranted, (4) a determination from the records of the Motor Vehicle Administration of all lienholders, (5) an application by the Town Council to the circuit court, thereby inaugurating a judicial proceeding for forfeiture, and (6) three publications of notice of the forfeiture action in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. If, as was the case here, the vehicle was subject to a lien, the town, following an order of forfeiture by the court, would have been required to turn the car over to the lienholder for sale, and would, in the end, have received only the net proceeds after satisfaction of all expenses, court costs, and the lien. That is a formidable process for a town
whose population, according to the 1991-92 Maryland Manual, numbered only 1,173.
Section 297 is not the only forfeiture statute operative in Maryland. Through the Controlled Substances Act, Congress, as a matter of Federal law, declared cocaine to be a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. § 812), the knowing and intentional possession of that substance to be unlawful ( § 844), and vehicles used to facilitate the transportation of it subject to forfeiture by the United States (§ 881(a)(4)). Such vehicles may be seized by the Attorney General without process when the seizure is incident to an arrest or when the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the pro
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