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Heckman v. J.C. Penney Life Insurance Co.11/23/2001
ntly of all other causes" language imposes upon plaintiffs the burden of showing that the accident was the predominant cause of Heckman's death. See Carroll v. Cuna Mutual Insurance Society, 894 P.2d 746, 754-55 (Colo. 1995); Continental Casualty Co. v. Maguire, 28 Colo. App. 173, 178-79, 471 P.2d 636, 638-39 (1970).
Predominant cause has also been described as the active, efficient, dominating, originating, or direct proximate cause. See Carroll v. Cuna Mutual Insurance Society, supra, 894 P.2d at 755. It is "not necessarily the last link in the chain of events, but that . . . from which the effect might be expected to follow, without the concurrence of any unforeseen circumstances." 7 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 101:46, at 101-140 through 101-141 (3d ed. 1997). See Bohrer v. Church Mutual Insurance Co., 965 P.2d 1258, 1265 (Colo. 1998)(efficient proximate cause sets in motion other causes, which, in an unbroken sequence, produce the result for which recovery is sought); Ore v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 435 F.2d 957, 959 (6th Cir. 1970)(efficient and predominating cause operates with reasonable certainty to occasion the loss).
" here a chain of events is set in motion by the peril insured against and is broken by a new and independent cause intervening between the peril insured against and the injury, but for which the injury would not have occurred, the peril insured against is the remote and not the proximate cause of the injury." See Couch on Insurance, supra, § 101:49 at 101-143.
Proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and may be decided as a matter of law only when reasonable minds could draw but one inference from the evidence. See Walcott v. Total Petroleum Inc., 964 P.2d 609, 611 (Colo. App. 1998).
Here, we conclude as a matter of law that Heckman's automobile accident was not the predominant cause of her death. The accident clearly started the chain of events leading to her death. But she did not die of injuries sustained in the accident; those injuries did not leave her incapacitated; the accident did not put her in a state of unconsciousness from which she did not recover; she was not ejected from the vehicle into the cold weather by the accident; and her vehicle was not, as a result of the accident, left in a lethally perilous position.
The only inference that can be drawn from the undisputed evidence in this case is that, for whatever reason, Heckman voluntarily left the shelter of her vehicle and exposed herself to the rigors of the cold outdoors. She made no attempt to walk the mile back to town for help but instead positioned herself away from the road, where she remained exposed to the cold. As a matter of law, her voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger constituted an intervening, superseding cause of death.
Because Heckman's own action, rather than the accident, was the predominant cause of her hypothermia and death, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendant. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Hawkins, 236 Ark. 302, 304-05, 365 S.W.2d 722, 723-24 (1963)(as a matter of law, death benefits not available under similarly worded policy, where car was stuck in an unimperiled position near high flood waters and insured drowned after removing herself from the safety of the car).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE DAVIDSON and JUDGE RULAND concur.
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