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Mays v. Taylor12/14/2001
til the time of the crash, he directed most of his attention to the back seat where the conflict between Ernst and Rupert had been developing. (Tr. pp. 174, 180, 209, 235). When he did take notice of Taylor's driving he saw that she frequently changed lanes in order to maintain her chosen speed of 60-65 mph. (Tr. pp. 209, 233, 235).
Melanie Shoaf, another eyewitness, confirmed that Taylor had operated the vehicle erratically. Shoaf, who was a nursing student at Youngstown State University at the time, was on her way to school when she encountered the vehicle. Shoaf followed the vehicle for some time on Route 422 that morning. In the minutes that preceded the accident Shoaf observed Taylor slow down, speed up and weave in and out of traffic. (Tr. pp. 255-256, 259, 261).
Further, while there was some disagreement regarding the amount of alcohol that Taylor consumed in the hours leading up to the crash, there was no dispute that she had a blood alcohol level of 0.13 after the crash. (Tr. p. 27). Not only was she six times the legal limit for an under-aged driver (she was eighteen at the time), but under Ohio's Traffic Code she was intoxicated as a matter of law. R.C. §4511.19.
Finally, the evidence was uncontested that Taylor was speeding at the time of the accident. Morgan testified that before the crash, Taylor reached speeds of 60 to 65 mph, nearly twice the posted speed limit of 35 mph. (Tr. pp. 205, 208, 261). Shoaf confirmed that the vehicle was speeding. (Tr. p. 261). Even Taylor, who had difficulty recalling the events leading to the crash, recounted that the group had departed the bar in a hurry to avoid an altercation with other patrons. (Tr. p. 111).
Appellant concedes that Taylor was speeding insisting, however, that speeding alone does not warrant a finding of recklessness. Perhaps if speeding alone were the only conduct involved in this case, we would concede this point to Appellant. Akers v. Stirn (1940), 136 Ohio St. 245. But, as already detailed above, the circumstances presented involve decidedly more than speeding. The undisputed evidence adduced at trial disclosed that Taylor was intoxicated, that she operated her vehicle erratically, that she did so at an excessive speed and that the driving conditions on the roads that morning were slippery. Later, she admitted that she recklessly operated her vehicle when she pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated vehicular homicide.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err when it concluded that reasonable people viewing this evidence, even in a light most favorable to Taylor, could only find that she was reckless. See Clark v. Hiatt (1957), 105 Ohio App. 402 (defendant acted with wanton and reckless misconduct where he attempted to negotiate an abrupt curve on a slippery road at night at an excessive rate of speed); and State v. Fitzwater (December 10, 1999), Hamilton App. Nos. C-981005, C-981006, unreported (defendant was reckless and therefore guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide where he was traveling well in excess of the speed limit and weaving through traffic moments before striking pedestrian); and State v. Caudill (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 252 (defendant was reckless and therefore guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide where he was operating his vehicle while intoxicated, speeding and driving erratically).
Once the trial court reached the conclusion that Taylor was reckless as a matter of law, it properly removed any question of comparative negligence on Curtis Mays' part from the case. Comparative negligence is not an available defense where the defendant acted wilfully, wantonly or recklessly. Schellhouse v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St
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