 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Lydia v. Horton10/30/2000
ee against bailor for negligent entrustment); Denby v. Davis, 188 S.E.2d 226 (Va. 1972)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390, the court concluded the correct test of liability for negligent entrustment of automobile to another is whether owner knew, or had reasonable cause to know, he was entrusting his automobile to an unfit driver likely to cause injury to others).
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts enlightens and elucidates that the theory of negligent entrustment is based on the negligence of the entrustor:
A parent, for example, like anyone else, may be negligent in entrusting to a child a dangerous instrument such as a gun, or a thing dangerous in the hands of that particular child because of his handicaps or propensity to misuse it, for example, matches or an automobile. Similarly the parent may be negligent in leaving such things where they are accessible to the child where misuse is a risk. (Footnotes omitted.)
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 123, at 914 (5th ed. 1984). Another commentator explains " he crux of the negligence is the knowledge of the entruster of the youth, inexperience, known propensity towards reckless and irresponsible behavior, or other quality of the entrustee, indicating the possibility that he will cause injury." 1 J. Dooley, Modern Tort Law § 23.01 (1977).
Many of our decisions follow closely the logic of the Restatement. See Howell v. Hairston, 261 S.C. 292, 199 S.E.2d 766 (1973); Jackson v. Price, 288 S.C. 377, 342 S.E.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1986); McAllister v. Graham, 287 S.C. 455, 339 S.E.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1986). The Restatement is a correct statement of the amalgamation of cases decided in South Carolina under various theories of law including: (1) "negligent entrustment" under Jackson, supra; and (2) negligence under Howell, supra.
We adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 308 and 390 as the appropriate standard for negligent entrustment.
III. First Party Cause of Action
We determine if there is a first party cause of action under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390. A first party cause of action under the theory of "negligent entrustment" of a vehicle to an intoxicated individual is novel in South Carolina.
In Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 332 S.C. 90, 504 S.E.2d 318 (1998), our Supreme Court concluded there is no first party cause of action under the alcohol control statutes against the tavern owner by an intoxicated adult. The Court ruled:
South Carolina Code Ann. § 61-4-580(2) prohibits the knowing sale of beer or wine to an intoxicated person, while § 61-6-2220 prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages contained in minibottles to intoxicated persons. In recognizing a private cause of action for a violation of these statutes, the Court of Appeals stated that their purpose is to promote public safety, and to prevent an already intoxicated person from becoming even more intoxicated, and thus an even greater risk to the public at large, when he leaves the establishment. We agree. The Court of Appeals went further, however, and held that another of the statutory purposes was to protect the intoxicated person from their own incompetence and helplessness, and therefore concluded the intoxicated patron himself was entitled to bring a negligence suit for a statutory violation. We disagree, and now hold that public policy is not served by allowing the intoxicated adult patron to maintain a suit for injuries which result from his own conduct.
Imposing liability on a tavern owner for continuing to serve an intoxicated person who later injures others serves public policy by imposing upon the tavern owner a dut
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 South Carolina DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|