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Lydia v. Horton10/30/2000
y to use judgment and discretion. We do not believe that the owner will exercise this judgment and discretion less prudently if he risks a law suit only when the intoxicated person injures others. The decision to refuse to serve alcoholic beverages, beer or wine to an intoxicated patron will be unaffected by our decision today. In overruling Christiansen [v. Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1985)], we join other jurisdictions that have refused to allow intoxicated persons to maintain a first party action against a tavern owner based on alleged violations of statutes imposing criminal penalties for the sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated adult. Tobias, 332 S.C. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 319-20.
Horton argues Tobias can be cited for the proposition that an adult who is voluntarily intoxicated is still held to a reasonable person standard. While Tobias may be instructive when considering the comparative negligence of the voluntarily intoxicated adult, it should in no way be determinative of whether a first party cause of action for negligent entrustment may be sustained. Tobias concludes "we join other jurisdictions that have refused to allow intoxicated persons to maintain a first party action against a tavern owner based on alleged violations of statutes imposing criminal penalties for the sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated adult." Id. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 320 (emphasis added). The theory of negligent entrustment was not involved in Tobias.
The Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of California considered a similar argument in Blake v. Moore, 208 Cal. Rptr. 703 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). California limits the tort liability of suppliers of alcohol. In Blake, the owner of the vehicle provided the alcohol consumed by the injured driver as well as the vehicle. The entrustee brought the action claiming he was too drunk to be entrusted the car. In the trial court, the entrustee argued the injuries were the result of two proximate causes: (1) the negligent entrustment of a vehicle to an obviously drunken driver; and (2) the intoxication. Because no third person was involved, the trial court granted defendant summary judgment. On appeal, the court explicated:
In reaching our conclusion to reverse the judgment we look to the "furnishing" statute which in most, but not all, cases protects the supplier of alcoholic beverages from tort liability. The rationale is that the proximate cause of drunk driving accidents is not in the giving or selling of the liquor, but is in the consumption itself. However, in this case more than liquor was supplied.
We find the immunity for the supplier of alcoholic beverages protects only against the risks directly flowing from the supply of the liquor. It does not provide immunity for the entrustment of the car. Therefore, two concurrent causes were at work when plaintiff lost control of the vehicle. Because comparative negligence principles apply, issues of fact were present, requiring trial on the merits. Blake, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 704 (emphasis added).
The California court acknowledged the difficulty the plaintiff would face in attempting to assign fault to the entrustor of the vehicle when comparing it to his own decision to drink and drive. However, the court emphasized the cause of action was viable nonetheless.
Negligent entrustment, as annunciated under the standard of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390, encompasses more than an intoxicated adult being given the keys to an automobile who is subsequently involved in an accident. It includes an individual giving a gun to a child who then shoots himself because he has no understanding of how to use the weapon or the risks involved. Negl
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