Todd v. Kelley3/10/2000
t previously aware.
Todd's motion for leave to amend made a prima facie showing, which the City did not rebut, that he had moved to amend "as soon as the necessity for altering the pleading [became] apparent." Burkett v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 607 So. 2d 138, 141-42 (Ala. 1992). Todd alleged that the need to alter his pleading did not become apparent until the four depositions taken on February 22 and February 23 had been transcribed and compared with earlier depositions and other evidence obtained during the discovery process.
In order to comply with the 42-day requirement of Rule 15(a), Todd would have had to amend his complaint to add the three new defendants by March 3, only 8 days after taking the last relevant deposition. Compare Tiller v. Nelson, 679 So. 2d 1095, 1099 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (stating that the plaintiff "made a strong showing of good cause justifying leave of court to amend her complaint" by averring that her claim arose less than 42 days before the first trial setting). Although the trial court has discretion to refuse an amendment, the refusal "must be based on a valid ground." Stallings v. Angelica Uniform Co., 388 So. 2d at 947. In light of Todd's showing that he did not have sufficient opportunity to state an earlier claim against Officers P.K. Johnson, Robbie Johnson, and Cauthen -- a showing that was unrebutted by the City -- we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that Todd had not established "good cause for leave to amend" the complaint to add the three officers.
II. The City's § 1983 Liability
Todd's action against Mayor Kelley, Chief Bradley, and Sgt. Fields in their official capacities is, in essence, an action against the City of Millbrook.
" suit against a governmental officer `in his official capacity' is the same as a suit `"against entity of which officer is an agent,"' Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 n.55 (1978)), and ... victory in such an `official-capacity' suit `imposes liability on the entity that [the officer] represents,' Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)." McMillian v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 785 n.2 (1997) (brackets added by the Court in McMillian). See also Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978); Roberts v. Joiner, 590 So. 2d 195, 203 (Ala. 1991) (Ingram, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 956 (1992).
However, we note:
" uing a defendant in [his official] capacity is usually necessary only when a suit against the governmental entity itself is barred [as, for example,] by the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution [or by Art. I, § 14 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, the state-sovereign- immunity clause]. In such instances, a suit against governmental officeholders in their official capacities is the only effective way to bring the governmental entity into court and obtain relief. Here, however, there are no eleventh-amendment [or state sovereign] immunity issues presented. Therefore, while allowable, there is no need to maintain suit against Mayor [Kelley, Chief of Police Bradley,] and Officer [Fields] in their official capacities." Shows v. Morgan, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1361 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
Because Todd did not sue Mayor Kelley, Chief Bradley, and Sgt. Fields in their individual capacities, and because Todd's "official-capacity" claim would impose liability only on the City those officials represent, we must determine whether the City can be held liable for the constitutional violations Todd alleges.
It is well settled that mu
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