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Dickerson v. Wilson4/11/2000
of (1) whether the individual was arrested; (2) whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the individual was driving while intoxicated; and (3) whether the individual refused to submit to the test. Section 577.041.4; Borgen v. Director of Revenue, 877 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Mo.App. W.D.1994).
At the close of Director's case, the trial court determined that Director had presented no evidence linking Dickerson to either vehicle involved in the accident, and therefore no reasonable grounds for the arresting officer to believe he had been driving while intoxicated. We disagree. Where the defendant admits to driving a vehicle which has been involved in an accident and offers no evidence to the contrary, it is reasonable grounds for arrest for driving while intoxicated, even though the arresting officer does not observe the defendant driving one of the vehicles. Pappin v. D.O.R., 958 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998). "Reasonable grounds" is virtually synonymous with probable cause. Wilcox v. Director of Revenue, 842 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992). The quantum of proof required to show reasonable grounds is substantially less than that required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the standard is one of a "cautious, trained and prudent police officer at the time of arrest." Id. at 242, 243. Although mere suspicion is not sufficient for reasonable grounds, absolute certainty is not required. Id. at 243. "An officer may have reasonable grounds to arrest for driving intoxicated, even when his evidence of "actually driving" is based on circumstantial evidence." Id. See also Persons v. D.O.R., 968 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998); State v. Stimmel, 800 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990).
When Officer Calvin was called to the scene of an auto accident, he observed Dickerson standing in the middle of the street adjacent to the two wrecked vehicles. He was swaying on his feet and smelled of intoxicants. Dickerson admitted to the officer that he had been driving southbound and hit the parked car. The other vehicle was a truck, and therefore it was reasonable to assume that Dickerson was driving the truck. The physical evidence confirmed that the right front of the truck impacted with the left rear of the car at the scene. Dickerson admitted that he "drove two beers," and later admitted to having had four beers. From all the surrounding circumstances, and Dickerson's admissions, the Director made a prima facie showing that Calvin had reasonable grounds to believe that Dickerson had been driving while intoxicated. Thus, the trial court erred in finding otherwise based on the record before us. We note, however, that the trial court effectively granted Dickerson a directed verdict at the close of the Director's case and thus Dickerson did not have an opportunity to present evidence. It is possible that Dickerson could present evidence which, if believed, might refute the Director's showing. Thus, the case must be remanded for new trial. Sullivan v. Director of Revenue, 936 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996). The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
Separate Opinion: None
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