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Accu-Fab & Construction3/14/2000
he hospital after his fall, a urine sample was taken to screen for drugs. This test was not done for the purpose of providing medical treatment, nor was permission obtained from Ladner or members of his family. Rather, the drug test was done as a result of an agreement between the hospital and Anderson to conduct drug tests on Anderson employees. Persons employed by Anderson were required to execute a written consent to post-injury drug testing. The actual drug testing was not performed by the hospital but by a private lab with the results sent directly to Anderson. The record established that Ladner was not an Anderson employee and not covered by the agreement between Anderson and the hospital.
. Our rules of evidence provide what is and is not admissible as evidence. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Mississippi Rule of Evidence 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, and all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.
. Both Accu-Fab and Anderson cite Hughes v. Tupelo Oil Co., 510 So. 2d 502 (Miss. 1987), as iron-clad authority that the drug screen performed on Ladner was admissible. However, a close reading of Hughes reveals the limited nature of that holding. In Hughes, the issue, as here, was whether the blood alcohol level of the decedent was admissible. In Hughes, the decedent, a pedestrian, was killed after being struck by a tractor-trailer truck while walking down the middle of the road. Id. at 504. The investigating law enforcement officer ordered the blood test pursuant to Mississippi's implied consent law; however, the supreme court held that the officer had no basis to order the test under the implied consent law because there was no evidence that the decedent was operating a motor vehicle. Id. at 505. Thus, having found that the blood test was ordered without proper authority, the court's analysis turned to the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in a civil trial. Id. Relying on United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the exclusionary rule had never been applied to exclude improperly obtained evidence in a civil proceeding. Hughes, 510 So. 2d at 505. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter improper police conduct. Id. Thus, since the suppression of the blood test would not deter the police officer who ordered the test, then there was no basis to exclude the otherwise relevant evidence. Id. But, the supreme court specifically held " e make no determination of the admissibility of evidence obtained through the wrongful acts of the party seeking its admission . . . ." Id.
. In the case sub judice, the question specifically not answered by the supreme court in Hughes is squarely presented here, and we answer it in favor of Ladner based on an application of our rules of evidence that the trial judge properly ruled that this evidence was inadmissible in favor of Anderson and Accu-Fab. Neither appellant had authority to draw samples, nor to order samples drawn of bodily fluids from the decedent for testing purposes. Ladner was not an employee of Anderson nor Accu- Fab, thus any drug-testing policy applicable to their employees necessarily did not apply to Ladner.
. " dmission or suppression of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion." K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 982 (Miss. 1999) (citing Broadhead v .Bonita Lakes Mall, Ltd. Partnership, 702 So. 2d 92,102 (Miss. 1997)) (quoting Sumrall v. Mi
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