 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Accu-Fab & Construction3/14/2000
rson and each of his subcontractors, by written contract, agreed to perform all work consistent with U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Standards (OSHA). Appellants argue that admission of information regarding OSHA standards was improper. However, during the course of oral argument before this Court, counsel for appellant indicated it was not the reference to OSHA standards, but rather the number of times the name of a federal administrative agency was invoked and whether such a frequent reference to OSHA unduly influenced the jury.
. As a matter of law, evidence regarding OSHA standards is not admissible to prove negligence per se, or the lack of negligence per se. Sumrall v. Mississippi Power Co., 693 So. 2d 359, 367 (Miss. 1997). However, our rules of evidence allow limited admissibility of certain evidence for one purpose but not for another. M.R.E. 105. Thus, applying Rule 105, we find the OSHA standards could be introduced to aid the trier of fact in determining whether the actions complained of were reasonable and consistent with industry standards provided that the jury was properly instructed as to the limited nature for which the OSHA standards were admissible. Instruction P-22(a) provided the necessary limitation on the use of the evidence, instructing that the OSHA standards could not be used to find negligence per se on the part of Anderson and Accu-Fab, but could be used as a measure of reasonable care consistent with industry standards.
. We find the purpose for which the trial court allowed the introduction of the OSHA standards was sufficiently limited and, therefore, not improper. Accordingly, this Court finds no error in the admission of OSHA standards or reference to OSHA.
VI. WHETHER ACCU-FAB WAS REQUIRED UNDER ITS CONTRACT TO INDEMNIFY ANDERSON.
. Accu-Fab was employed as a subcontractor by Anderson. Accu-Fab began its work without a written contract. This work was begun prior to Ladner's accident which occurred on March 7, 1994. After the March 7, 1994 fatal accident, Anderson sent a written contract to Accu-Fab for its execution.
. This contract was received by Accu-Fab on March 9, 1994, executed and returned to Anderson on March 11, 1994. The contract, as executed by Accu-Fab, included general language which required indemnification of Anderson by Accu-Fab. The jury found no entitlement to indemnification, and Anderson now argues that indemnification should have been compelled as a matter of law.
. While not argued by the parties, we are compelled to note that this state's public policy, as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 31-5-41 (Rev. 1990), precludes enforcement of this indemnification agreement. Miss. Code Ann. § 31-5-41 reads as follows:
With respect to all public or private contracts or agreements, for the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of buildings, structures, highway bridges, viaducts, water, sewer, or gas distribution systems, or other work dealing with construction, or for any moving, demolition or excavation connected therewith, every covenant, promise, and/or agreement contained therein to indemnify or hold harmless another person from the person's own negligence is void as against public policy and wholly enforceable.
This section does not apply to construction bonds or insurance contracts or agreements.
It is clear that this is a construction contract where Anderson seeks indemnification for its negligent actions. Such indemnification is void as against public policy as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 31-5-41.
. In addition to being violative of public policy, this claim also fails for lack of conside
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Mississippi DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|