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Hart v. Miller4/19/2000
s including only official-capacity claims." Egerdahl v. Hibbing Community College, 72 F3d 615, 619 (8th Cir 1995). In Egerdahl, the Eighth Circuit specifically rejected Egerdahl's argument she had sued the officials in their individual capacity because she referred to them by their names in the caption. Id. at 620. Because Hart's complaint is silent as to whether Supervisors were sued in their official capacity, we will interpret the complaint as including only official capacity claims. ()
[ ] A party cannot maintain a § 1983 action against a state official if the claim is against the official in his official capacity. Hafner, 520 NW2d at 591; Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 US 58, 64, 109 SCt 2304, 2308, 105 LEd2d 45, 53 (1989). Precedent establishes that state officials sued in their official capacities are not "persons" within the ambit of § 1983. This Court has stated:
suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself. We see no reason to adopt a different rule in the present context, particularly when such a rule would allow petitioner to circumvent congressional intent by a mere pleading device. We hold that neither the State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983. Hafner, 520 NW2d at 591 (quoting Will, 491 US at 71, 109 SCt at 2312, 105 LE2d at 58). Insofar as Supervisors were sued in their official capacities, they were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
[ ] Even if Hart had sued Supervisors in their individual capacity, Hart's claim would fail. The liability of Supervisors under § 1983 must be based on more than their right to control employees. Payton v. City of Detroit, 536 NW2d 233, 245 (MichApp 1995) (citing Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F2d 416, 421 ([6thCir 1984]). A supervisory official's liability under § 1983 cannot be based solely on the theory of respondeat superior. Id. The court in Payton stated in order for a plaintiff to hold a supervisory official liable for violations of civil rights:
here must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate. Id.
The court pointed to Smith v. Heath, 691 F2d 220 ([6thCir 1982]) as an example of holding a supervisory official liable. Payton, 536 NW2d at 246. In Smith, a police supervisory officer was liable under § 1983 because he, as the officer in charge of the investigation, was directly responsible for and personally participated in the unconstitutional search of the plaintiff's home. 691 F2d at 225.
[ ] In this case, Supervisors were not directly involved in Miller's investigation at Hart's apartment. There is an insufficient showing in the record Supervisors authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged conduct of Miller against Hart. A § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the alleged policy of the superiors "was the moving force behind the constitutional violation." Rogers, 152 F3d at 799 (citing Jane Doe A. v. Special Sch. Dist, 901 F2d 642, 646 (8th Cir 1990)). See also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 US 312, 326, 102 SCt 445, 454, 70 LEd2d 509, 521 (1981). No such showing having been made, Supervisors are entitled to be granted summary judgment.
[ ] We affirm on Issue 2.
[ ] 3. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment t
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