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Jefferson v. Kimpel4/13/2000
cent jurisdiction. He attributes the "reasonable grounds" requirement to Wis. Stat. § 345.22, which states that a person may be arrested for a traffic offense if the officer "has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic regulation." And he equates that standard to the "reasonable suspicion" requirement for investigatory stops. The "reasonable suspicion" standard is a common sense test whose "fundamental focus" is reasonableness under all of the facts and circumstances present. State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139-40, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). It asks the questions: "What is reasonable under the circumstances? What would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience? What should a reasonable police officer do?" State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 83-84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990). At bottom, "if any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of other innocent inferences that could be drawn, the officers have the right to temporarily detain the individual for the purpose of inquiry." Id. at 84. And the "reasonable suspicion" determination is a question of law, which we review de novo on appeal. State v. Babbitt, 188 Wis. 2d 349, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994).
. Assuming, without deciding, that this is the test for the officers' conduct in this case, it was met. They observed Kimpel's car persistently weaving within its lane and it did not respond to the squad-car lights and siren, even though the officers were close behind it, and even though other cars both behind and in front of Kimpel's did respond. They observed him drinking from a can while driving, and, when they saw his car the second time, it was apparent from the elapsed time and distance from their first encounter with him that he probably had been speeding. We think those facts more than meet the argued standard-whether with respect to speeding, failure to yield to an emergency vehicle, unsafe lane deviation, or perhaps some other traffic violation.
. Kimpel next argues that, even if the officers had grounds to believe he was violating the traffic laws, they could neither stop nor arrest him outside of Jefferson County because they were not following him in "fresh pursuit." Citing City of Brookfield v. Collar, 148 Wis. 2d 839, 436 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1989), he states that there are three factors which must exist before an officer will be found to be in fresh pursuit: (1) the officer must be acting without unnecessary delay; (2) the pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted (although uninterrupted surveillance is not required); and (3) consideration must be given to the relationship between the commission of the offense, the commencement of the pursuit, and the apprehension of the suspect. Id. at 842-43. He claims that the officers' pursuit of him was "neither continuous nor uninterrupted." Also, basing his contention on the fact that the circuit court apparently considered the "pursuit" to have begun only after the officers had been called off of their response to the dispatcher's initial directions, he claims that the only observation they could have made of his conduct at that time was that he had covered enough ground since they last saw him to support an inference that he had been speeding; and he says that's insufficient. Again, we disagree.
. It is true, as Kimpel states, that the officers did not attempt to stop him when they first saw him and made their initial observations. But they were, as indicated, responding to an alarm call, at that time. Had they not been, we assume they would have attempted to make contact with Kimpel then and there, given his weaving, his dri
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