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Jackson v. Daley6/3/1999
zed by this chapter." Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1) (1989).
. This statute mandates that driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.10% or more is a per se violation of the law. Although the wording of Jury Instruction 12 incorrectly correlates 0.10% with intoxication, the bottom line is that the decedent committed a per se violation of the statute. We have held that when an injury results from a party violating a statute, and the injured party was in the category of persons the statute was designed to protect, then the negligence of the party violating the statute is established as a matter of law. Thomas v. McDonald, 667 So. 2d 594, 596 (Miss. 1995); McRee v. Raney, 493 So. 2d 1299, 1300 (Miss. 1986); Stong v. Freeman Truck Line Inc., 456 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1984). When a party is negligent as a matter of law, the trial court must so instruct the jury. McRee, 493 So. 2d at 1300. Failure to instruct the jury of negligence as a matter of law is reversible error. McRee, 493 So. 2d at 1300. Here, Jury Instruction 12 required that if the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that Jackson violated the statute, then they must find that he was negligent. Thus, Jury Instruction 12 met the McRee standard of informing the jury that if they found that Jackson violated § 63-11-30 by driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or higher, then he was negligent as a matter of law. Jury Instruction 12 correctly informed the jury that if they found that this violation of the statute was the sole and proximate cause of the accident, then it was the jury's duty to find for the defendant. Accordingly, we find that the instruction was sufficient despite the fact that it contained inaccurate language.
.The appellant also objects to Jury Instruction 12 claiming that there is no credible evidence that Jackson was intoxicated. As previously stated, the record is replete with evidence that Jackson was under the influence of intoxicating liquors. Thus, this contention is without merit.
III.WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JURY INSTRUCTION NUMBER 11?
.Next, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred in granting Jury Instruction 11 on the grounds that it was cumulative with other instructions granted and improperly directed the jury's attention to the defendant's theory of the case. Instruction 11 reads:
"The Court instructs the jury that, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's deceased at the time of the accident, was driving his automobile at a greater rate of speed that would permit him to avoid striking objects when they came into range of the lights of his vehicle, then in such event the plaintiff's deceased was guilty of negligence; and if you further find from a preponderance of the evidence that such failure, if you so find was the sole and proximate cause of the accident, then it is your sworn duty to find for the defendant."
This instruction informed the jury of the well established rule that a motorist is negligent if he operates a vehicle at such a speed that it cannot be stopped within the range of the driver's vision. Hood v. Oakley, 519 So. 2d 1236, 1240 (Miss. 1988) (citing Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812, 815 (Miss. 1972)). "The 'range of vision' rule is to be applied according to the facts and circumstances of the individual case." Hood, 519 So. 2d at 1240 (citing Huff v. Boyd, 242 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1971)). Here, Jury Instruction 11 enlightened the jury about the "range of vision" rule, so that the jurors could apply it to the facts and circumstances of the case.
.The appellant contends that Jury Instruction 11 was similar to Jury Instruction 13 and that the trial court should no
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