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Jackson v. Daley6/3/1999
t have granted both. Jury Instruction 13 stated:
"The Court instructs the jury that if you find from a preponderance of the testimony that the Plaintiff was not driving his vehicle at a reasonable speed in view of existing conditions, or did not maintain proper control of his vehicle, or failed to maintain a proper lookout in view of existing conditions, then such failure, if any, constituted negligence. The Court further instructs the jury that if said failure, if any, was the sole proximate cause of the accident, it is your sworn duty to find for the defendant."
.When reviewing jury instructions we will review all of the instructions together, rather than each isolated instruction. Hull v. State, 687 So. 2d 708, 722 (Miss. 1996). We have held that refusal of a repetitive jury instruction is not error. Allman v. State, 571 So. 2d 244, 252 (Miss. 1990); Hood v. Oakley, 519 So. 2d at 1240. The appellant argues transversely that granting repetitive jury instructions is reversible error. This is not necessarily the case. In Wall v. State, 413 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Miss. 1982), we found that one repetitive, abstract jury instruction was not enough to mislead the jury; however, we did advise against adding surplus and repetitive instructions.
.While Jury Instructions 11 and 13 are similar, each presents a different defense. Instruction 11 presents the defense that if Jackson violated the "range of vision" rule, then he was negligent. Jury Instruction 13 does not address the "range of vision" rule, but rather is a general negligence instruction listing ways in which Jackson might have been negligent. Instruction 13 informs the jury that Jackson was negligent if he did not maintain a reasonable speed, proper control of his vehicle, or a proper lookout. A jury could find that Jackson did not violate the "range of vision" rule, yet was still negligent according to the elements in Instruction 13. We do not believe that the challenged instruction misled the jury or improperly focused on the defendant's theory of the case. The trial court afforded the plaintiff the same opportunity to show different ways in which Jefferson Davis County might be negligent in Jury Instructions 6 and 7. After reviewing the record and the jury instructions in their entirety, we find that the trial court did not err in allowing Jury Instruction 11 and Jury Instruction 13.
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO NAME U.S.F.&G; AS A PARTY AND IN OVERRULING THE PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE DEFENSE COUNSEL COMMENTING IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY WOULD HAVE TO PAY THE VERDICT.
A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO NAME U.S.F.&G; AS A PARTY.
.The appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing U.S.F.&G; to be named as a party. The appellant claims that, because the trial court had determined that Jefferson Davis County could not be liable, due to sovereign immunity, U.S.F. &G; was the only party that had an interest in the outcome, and therefore, should be named as a party. At the time of the trial Judge's ruling, our precedent clearly prohibited direct actions against insurance companies by third parties. Westmoreland v. Raper, 511 So. 2d 884, 885 (Miss. 1987); Smith v. City of West Point, 475 So. 2d 816, 819 (Miss. 1985). In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eakins, No. 96-CT-00034-SCT, 1998 WL 852920, *3 (Miss. Dec. 10, 1998), we overruled the line of cases, including Westmoreland, which prohibited direct actions against insurance companies. In their place, we held that under Rule 57 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, an insurance company may be named as a party to
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