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Polk v. State4/30/2003
t's decision to allow lay-opinion testimony under Rule 701 will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
In order to offer opinion testimony under Rule 701, a witness first must have the requisite personal knowledge of the facts as provided under Ark. R. Evid. 602, and second any inferences or opinions expressed by the witness must pass the rational connection and helpful tests of Rule 701. Moore v. State, 58 Ark. App. 120, 947 S.W.2d 395 (1997). "The rational connection test means only that the opinion or inference is one which a normal person would form on the basis of observed facts." Carton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 303 Ark. 568, 572, 798 S.W.2d 674, 675 (1990) (citations omitted). A witness "may express the opinion or inference rather than the underlying observations if the expression would be `helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.'" Id. The question here then is whether Donham's testimony relative to appellant's rate of speed is rationally based on his perception.
The record reflects that Donham was the investigating officer for the accident involving the parties. He observed the scene and created a diagram of the accident which pinpointed skid marks, yaw marks, gouge marks, debris, and the location of the vehicles. At the scene, Donham located the area of impact, traced back skid marks, examined the parties' vehicles, and determined that appellant's vehicle left a sixty-two-foot yaw mark. He checked the "drag factor"of the roadway, the factor that keeps a vehicle on the road, to determine the friction of the road. Clearly, Donham had the requisite personal knowledge of the facts of this case. The record further shows that based on the information that Donham personally gathered from the accident scene, he converted it to an actual speed rating using a universal formula contained in a computer program. Although Donham used a computer program to convert the data, all the information imputed into the computer was based on facts as he had observed or perceived them. Therefore, Donham's opinion that appellant was traveling eighty-one miles per hour when the accident occurred also was admissible as lay opinion.
Additionally, we hold that, under the facts of this case, if we were to conclude that the testimony was inadmissible, the error was harmless. This court has consistently held that under the harmless-error rule, when evidence of guilt is overwhelming, and the error slight, we can declare the error to be harmless. Baker v. State, 334 Ark. 330, 974 S.W.2d 474 (1998). Absent Donham's testimony that appellant was speeding, appellant admitted driving her vehicle while intoxicated, which in and of itself manifested extreme indifference to the value of human life. As a result of appellant's driving while under the influence, several people were seriously injured. Moreover, it is well established that the courts will not presume prejudice, and we will not reverse the trial court's ruling absent a showing of prejudice. Windsor v. State, 338 Ark. 649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999). Here, appellant made no showing of prejudice.
Accordingly, based on our review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not err in admitting Donham's testimony.
Affirmed.
Stroud, C.J., and Roaf, J., agree.
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