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People v. Benson4/16/1997
ed at the preliminary hearing. There, the court stated: "By the provisions of section 666, for example, a petty theft may be charged as a felony if a defendant has been previously convicted of one of several theft-related crimes." ( Miranda v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 907-908; see also People v. Stevens, supra, 48 Cal. App. 4th at p. 987 ["When a defendant has suffered any of the enumerated theft-related prior convictions, a subsequent petty theft can be a felony. ( § 666.)"].)
It is clear from reading the foregoing cases that the statements in each opinion that section 666's priors are "theft-related" were not necessary to the Disposition of the questions in those cases and therefore are not authority for that proposition. "'"The statement of a principle not necessary to the decision will not be regarded either as a part of the decision or as a precedent that is required by the rule of stare decisis to be followed . . ., no matter how often repeated. . . ."' ( People v. Squier (1993) 15 Cal. App. 4th 235, 240.) "Absent persuasive precedent on the issue, resolution of the question presented requires this court to determine the Legislature's intent in enacting section " and, in the process of that determination, to follow "'accepted rules for statutory construction . . . .'" ( County of Tulare v. Campbell (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 847, 853.)
We turn to those rules. "In construing a statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining that intent, we first examine the words of the respective statutes: If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. [Citation.] Where the statute is clear, courts will not interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist. [Citations.] If, however, the terms of a statute provide no definitive answer, then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] We must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences. [Citation.]" ( People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal. 4th 145, 151, 906 P.2d 1232, internal quotation marks omitted.)
With these rules in mind, we pause briefly to discuss one of the extrinsic sources used for determining legislative intent, the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. That doctrine "declares that the meaning of a word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other terms which the Legislature has associated with it in the statute, and that its scope may be enlarged or restricted to accord with those terms. [Citations.]" ( People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 129, 142, 95 Cal. Rptr. 601, 486 P.2d 129, conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) If we place reliance on the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, then section 666 must be limited to theft-related burglaries given that all of the other prior convictions supporting a felony conviction in section 666 are specifically theft-related. But such doctrine is merely an extrinsic aid to interpretation and is "to be used only when the clear meaning of the words used in the statute is doubtful . . . ." ( People v. Fields (1980) 105 Cal. App. 3d 341, 344, 164 Cal. Rptr. 336; 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1992) § 47.16, p. 183.) It "may not be used to create doubts or offset the plain meaning of the statutes [citation]." ( People v. Fields, supra, at p. 344.)
Initial reliance on the doctri
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