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People v. Benson4/16/1997
ments were added pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b) for the prior prison terms.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the legislative history of Vehicle Code section 23175 indicated the Legislature intended three years to be the maximum penalty applicable to repeat drunk drivers and the use of a prior prison term for enhancement purposes was barred if the underlying conviction is used to qualify the current offense for felony punishment.
The Supreme Court took a quite different view. ". . . Vehicle Code section 23175's purpose to authorize felony punishment of habitual drunk drivers is fully compatible with section 667.5(b)'s purpose to provide for additional punishment of a felon whose service of a prior prison term failed to deter future criminality. As it stands, Vehicle Code section 23175 treats both prior misdemeanor and felony habitual drunk drivers in the same manner -- for both categories of offenders, the current offense may be elevated to a felony. But where one (or more) of the requisite prior convictions is a felony for which a prison term was served -- reflecting a more serious crime and a more blameworthy offender -- application of both statutes leads to the rational result that a more culpable habitual drunk driver receives greater punishment." ( People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal. 4th at p. 153.) There is no persuasive reason for reaching a different result with respect to the sentencing provisions of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i).
Appellant next attempts to persuade us that the Three Strikes law is a general recidivist punishment statute whereas section 666 is a specific statute punishing recidivist thieves. He argues that "'where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.'" (Quoting In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal. 2d 651, 654, 276 P.2d 593; see also People v . Thomas (1992) 4 Cal. 4th 206, 213, 841 P.2d 159; In re Boatwright (1932) 216 Cal. 677, 683, 15 P.2d 755.) The defendant in Coronado made a similar argument that Vehicle Code section 23175 is a "special statute" which controls over section 667.5, subdivision (b), a "general statute." But the Supreme Court was not persuaded in that case. Nor are we in this case.
"The rule does not apply . . . unless each element of the general statute corresponds to an element on the face of the specific [ sic ] statute or it appears from the entire context that a violation of the special statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the general statute. [Citations.]" ( People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal. 4th at p. 154, internal quotation marks omitted, citing People v. Jenkins (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 494, 502, 170 Cal. Rptr. 1, 620 P.2d 587; see also People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal. 3d 290, 295-296, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279.)
The elements in section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) do not correspond with the elements in section 666. Section 666 provides a punishment scheme which affects petty thieves who have previously been incarcerated for a specifically designated misdemeanor or felony conviction. Punishment may not be imposed under section 667, subdivision (b) unless the defendant is convicted of a felony and has "been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony offenses." Section 667, subdivision (b) does not require incarceration for the prior conviction as does section 666. In sum, felony punishment is permissible under section 666 even where the defendant has never been convicted of a felony. That is not possible under section 667. Nor will applicat
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