 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
People v. Benson4/16/1997
ion of the felony punishment provisions of section 666 "necessarily or commonly" result in the application of the punishment provisions of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). Even though a burglary conviction may also elevate a current theft offense to a felony under section 666, it is not necessarily or commonly the case that the qualifying burglary conviction will have been a residential burglary triggering application of the Three Strikes law. The "special over general rule" has no more application here than it did in Coronado. ( People v. Coronado, supra, 12 Cal. 4th at pp. 154-155.)
IV.
Two Counts Equal Two Strikes
We turn to appellant's contention that it is error to treat his 1980 convictions as two "strikes" because his burglary and assault with intent to commit murder convictions were part of a single act against a single victim committed at the same time with a single intent and were punished as a single crime pursuant to section 654. Appellant relies on various rules of statutory construction in his effort to convince us that the Legislature intended that first and second strikes be separate "cases" not separate "counts" within one case. Again, we are not persuaded.
We begin with section 954. That statute provides that defendants may be charged with and convicted of "two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense . . ., under separate counts" in the same case. ( People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 351, 354, 228 Cal. Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 595.) This leads us to section 654 which states: "An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; . . . " This section has been interpreted to preclude multiple punishment not only for individual criminal acts, but also for courses of conduct that are motivated by a single intent or objective. ( People v. Pearson, supra, at p. 359; People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal. 3d 625, 636-639, 105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 504 P.2d 905; Neal v. State of California, supra, 55 Cal. 2d at p. 19.) Section 654 "bars multiple punishment, not multiple conviction" ( In re Alberto R. (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1314) and, in some instances, one act which violates more than one statute "may even be separately punished." ( People v. Valdez (1994) 23 Cal. App. 4th 46, 49.)
The purpose of this procedure developed to reconcile the policies of permitting multiple convictions while protecting the defendant from multiple punishment was to give the trial court "the discretion in sentencing on more than one count to select the count on which sentence is to be carried out, even if it is a count carrying a lesser penalty, and to stay sentence on the remaining counts as to which sentence is imposed. [Citations.]" ( People v. Thompson (1994) 24 Cal. App. 4th 299, 308; People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal. 3d at p. 360.)
To prevent future multiple enhancements based upon stayed convictions, the court in Pearson developed the following rule: "Any subsequent sentences imposed on defendant can be enhanced on the basis of the convictions for which he served a sentence; but convictions for which service of sentence was stayed may not be so used unless the Legislature explicitly declares that subsequent penal or administrative action may be based on such stayed convictions. Without such a declaration, it is clear that section 654 prohibits defendant from being disadvantaged in any way as a result of the stayed convictions." ( People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal. 3d at p. 361, emphasis added; In re Alberto R., supra, 235 Cal. App. 3d
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 California DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|