 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Souza v. City of Antioch4/30/1997
party. In cases where police are called to make swift judgments to mitigate the danger posed by unpredictable felons, we have been particularly hesitant do so. The rule our courts have fashioned holds that police officers have no duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to persons who are placed at risk by others except under narrow and specific circumstances providing social justification for their liability. (See Wallace v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 12 Cal. App. 4th 1385, 1396 [ Wallace ].) Simply stated, our courts have found that the police owe no duty to crime victims in those cases where they have not acted to protect them, i.e., cases of nonfeasance. In contrast, when the police actively involve themselves in situations where a third party threatens another, we have imposed upon them an affirmative duty, generally under the rubric of a "special relationship" with either the victim or the actor, to exercise reasonable care.
Such " special relationship between the police and an individual has been found in a few narrow circumstances where the police made specific promises to undertake a particular action and failed to do so (see Morgan v. County of Yuba (1964) 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508), where the police created or increased a peril by affirmative acts ( McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 252, 74 Cal. Rptr. 389, 449 P.2d 453 [ McCorkle ]) or where the police voluntarily undertook to aid an individual, took affirmative steps to aid the individual and by the acts lulled the individual into a false sense of security ( Mann v. State of California (1977) 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 139 Cal. Rptr. 82 [ Mann ])." ( M.B. v. City of San Diego (1991) 233 Cal. App. 3d 699, 704-705, 284 Cal. Rptr. 555 [ M.B. ].) This case does not fall cleanly into any of these recognized categories. To answer the question before us, then, we must examine the principles undergirding our tradition of imposing a duty in those situations where the police take affirmative steps to mitigate a foreseeable danger.
"Legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done." (Tarasoff, (supra) , 17 Cal. 3d at p. 434.) The essential question is " '. . . whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct. . . .' " (Ibid.) "Foreseeability of risk . . . of . . . primary importance in establishing . . . duty." ( Grafton v. Mollica (1965) 231 Cal. App. 2d 860, 865, 42 Cal. Rptr. 306.) "Defendant owes a duty, in the sense of a potential liability for damages, only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous, and hence negligent, in the first instance. [Citations.]" ( Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912.) " '. . . Duty, in other words, is measured by the scope of the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails.' " (Id., quoting 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) § 16.15, p. 1018, fns. omitted.) So, to establish the extent of a legal duty -- what it is a person ought refrain from doing -- we first ask what harm might foreseeably arise from the contemplated act and whom might it foreseeably befall?
While the job of police officer carries with it no greater obligation to others individually, " '. . . person does not, by becoming a police officer, insulate himself from any of the basic duties which everyone owes to other people . . . .' " ( Williams v. State of California (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 18, 24, fn. 3, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137 [ Williams ].) "A person who has not created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to t
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 California DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|