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BEALE v. SECRETARY OF STATE4/18/1997
[ 1] Fred Beale and Llewellyn Verrill appeal from judgments entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Alexander, J.),
affirming the suspensions of their licenses to operate a motor vehicle that were administratively imposed by the Secretary of State. On appeal they challenge the constitutionality of the June 29, 1995, effective date of certain sections of P.L. 1995, ch. 368, § AAA. They contend that the portions of the statute dealing with operating motor vehicles while under the influence of intoxicants or with excessive amounts of alcohol in the blood, pursuant to which their licenses were administratively suspended, should not apply to them because the statutes were not in effect on July 1, 1995, the date on which Beale and Verrill operated motor vehicles while under the influence of intoxicants. They argue that those provisions, enacted as part of P.L. 1995, ch. 368 as emergency legislation effective June 29, 1995, are not emergency provisions because they are not related to the emergency recited in the preamble. Accordingly, they argue that the provisions did not become effective until September 29, 1995. We disagree and affirm the judgments.
[ 2] Beale was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (Class D) in violation of 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1) (1996), on July 1, 1995. On March 1, 1996, Beale pleaded guilty to the charge, and the court subsequently ordered his license suspended for ninety days, imposed a $350 fine, and incarcerated him for forty-eight hours. The record reveals that Beale had been convicted twice in November of 1986 for operating under the influence of intoxicants. In addition, he had one administrative suspension in 1990 for his refusal to take a chemical test. Sometime after March 8, 1996, the Secretary of State administratively suspended Beale's license for six years to run consecutive to an eighteen-month suspension for his refusal to take a chemical test on the date of the crime. See 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2451(3), (4) (1996). Pursuant to the law as amended, the two previous convictions, because they were within ten years of the date of Beale's present conviction, were utilized in determining the period of suspension. Pursuant to the prior law containing only a six-year look back period, these previous convictions would not have been considered. Following the denial of his request for an administrative hearing on the six-year suspension by the Secretary of State, Beale sought review by the Superior Court pursuant to 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2485(5) (1996), and M.R.Civ.P. 80C.
[ 3] Verrill's motor vehicle license was administratively suspended for an eighteen-month period, beginning September 24, 1995, based on his operation of a motor vehicle with an excessive level of blood alcohol on July 1, 1995. Verrill had one previous conviction for operating under the influence that occurred on June 24, 1987, within ten years of the suspension of Verrill's license; thus, this offense is a second offense for suspension purposes pursuant to the new law. See 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2453(6) (1996). After his suspension was affirmed at an administrative hearing on November 8, 1995, Verrill sought
[ 4] Beale and Verrill contend that the statutory changes relating to license suspensions were enacted unconstitutionally as emergency legislation. They contend that the OUI portions of the Act were not enacted as a result of any emergency and are unrelated to the appropriations bill in which they were passed. Therefore, they argue, the OUI provisions should not be deemed effective until September 29, 1995. Accordingly, they contend that because they operated a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants or with excessive blood alcohol on July 1, 1995,
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