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State v. Gaines4/11/1997
nation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 406; see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 839-40, 115 S. Ct. 1769, (1995) (per curiam). Since the trial court's findings as to race neutrality and purposeful discrimination will depend in large measure on the trial Judge's evaluation of credibility, these findings should be given great deference. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 89 n.21. We conclude that the trial court's findings were supported by the record and hold that the trial court properly overruled defendants' objections to the excusal of these six prospective jurors.
As to Mr. Caldwell, we first note that Gaines was the only defendant to object to his excusal. Upon Gaines' objection the trial court specifically found that there was no prima facie showing of racial discrimination. The trial court went on to state that "plenty of cause exists, reasons" for the excusal of this prospective juror. Therefore, the prosecutor did not set forth his reasons for excusing Caldwell.
Assuming arguendo that a prima facie case of racial discrimination existed, the trial court nonetheless found that there were sufficient race-neutral reasons for excusing this particular venireman. A review of the voir dire of Caldwell reveals that he had a history of temporary employment; that he had two sons, ages eighteen and fourteen; and that he had been arrested for driving while impaired. We give the trial court's findings great deference. Id. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly overruled defendant's objection to the excusal of prospective juror Caldwell.
Defendants next contend the trial court erroneously denied their motions to prohibit the State from peremptorily challenging prospective jurors on the basis of gender and to allow defendants to make an evidentiary record to show the prosecutor's gender-based peremptory challenges. Defendant Gaines filed a pretrial motion to prohibit the State from peremptorily challenging prospective jurors on the basis of gender. At a pretrial hearing defendant Gaines renewed this motion and moved the trial court, upon objection, to hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury on the gender-discrimination issue so that the appropriate information could be included in the record; the State could offer its neutral justifications, if any; and then the trial court could determine whether an equal protection violation had occurred. Codefendant Harris joined in these motions. The trial court denied the motions.
In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that the State may not, under the Equal Protection Clause, intentionally discriminate on the basis of gender in the exercise of its peremptory challenges. The decision in J.E.B. was rendered in 1994, after this case was tried. However, in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987), the Supreme Court held that Batson applies to litigation pending on direct state review when Batson was decided. Thus, we conclude that the holding in J.E.B. is applicable to this case pending on direct review when J.E.B. was decided.
Defendants assert that their constitutional rights were violated by the denial of this motion and that this denial prevented them from making an evidentiary record about challenges of women and from showing that the prosecutor's challenges of women were gender-discriminatory. We find this contention to be without merit.
"As with race-based Batson claims, a party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the
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