BUSH v. STATE12/1/1995
ge for or against a party to the suit." Morgan County Commission v. Powell, 292 Ala. 300, 311, 293 So.2d 830, 839 (1974). . . . A mere accusation of bias unsupported by substantial fact does not require disqualification of a judge. Taylor v. Taylor, 387 So.2d 849, 852 (Ala.Civ.App. 1980).' Ross v. Luton, 456 So.2d 249, 254 (Ala. 1984). In this State, the general rule is that a judge is presumed to be qualified and unbiased, McMurphy v. State, 455 So.2d 924, 929 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984), and the movant has a substantial burden in proving otherwise. Irby v. State, 429 So.2d 1179 (Ala. Cr. App. 1983). 'Evidence must be presented to prove the judge possesses a personal bias as opposed to one that is judicial in nature. Personal as opposed to judicial bias is characterized by an attitude of extrajudicial origin derived non coram judice.' Moreland v. State, 469 So.2d 1305, 1307 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985). 'Bias and prejudice must be shown by the conduct of the
trial judge and may not be presumed or inferred by his subjective views.' Hartman v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 436 So.2d 837, 841 (Ala. 1983). 'The appellant must present evidence to prove the personal bias of a judge, or else his motion cannot prevail.' Slinker v. State, 344 So.2d 1264, 1268 (Ala. Cr. App. 1977). On appeal, the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself will not be reversed in the absence of clear evidence of bias or prejudice. Moreland, 469 So.2d at 1307.
"In McMurphy, 455 So.2d at 929, this court observed,
" 'As stated by the Alabama Supreme Court in the case of In re Raines, 294 Ala. 360, 317 So.2d 559 (1975), "pretrial involvement or knowledge on the part of a trial judge does not necessarily create an unconstitutional risk bias." Id., at 366, 317 So.2d 559. . . .
" '. . . .
" '. . . Nor is bias proved simply because the trial judge who presided at the second trial of defendant had also presided at his first trial and heard evidence later found to be inadmissible by an appellate court. Walker v. State, 38 Ala. App. 204, 84 So.2d 383 (1955).'
"This court has found no error in a trial judge's refusal to recuse himself in cases involving the retrial of a capital offense. Giles v. State, [554 So.2d 1073] (Ala. Cr. App. 1984); Whisenhant v. State, 482 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982), aff'd. in pertinent part, 482 So.2d 1241, 1245 (Ala. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 482 So.2d 1247 (Ala.), remanded for new sentencing hearing, 482 So.2d 1249 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984). The result of Giles and Whisenhant is founded on the defendant's failure to prove bias on the part of the trial judge."
Rutledge v. State, 523 So.2d 1087, 1109 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987), rev'd on other ground, 523 So.2d 1118 (Ala. 1988).
Contrary to the appellant's assertion, we find no evidence that the trial judge in this case was personally biased toward the appellant. The appellant has failed to rebut the presumption that the trial judge was qualified and unbiased and, thus, we find no error in the court's denial of the appellant's motion.
VIII.
The appellant contends that he was denied his constitutional rights by the state's exercise of its peremptory jury strikes in a racially discriminatory manner, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). He raised the Batson issue by motion to quash the venire after the jury was selected and before the jury was sworn.
Under Batson, the appellant was initially required to make a prima facie showing that the state had exercised a peremptory challenge or challenges on the basis of race. To prove a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Bats
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