People v. Barton12/18/1995
true self-defense, it is tempting to treat unreasonable self-defense as a "defense" as that term is used in Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal. 3d at pages 716-717. Indeed, in People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal. 3d 307, 185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311 (hereafter Wickersham), this court erroneously yielded to that temptation.
In Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal. 3d 307, the defendant was charged with murder after she had fatally shot her husband. At trial, she denied intentionally killing her husband, claiming that her husband had attempted to grab the gun, which discharged accidentally during the ensuing struggle. The trial court did not instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, and the jury convicted defendant of first degree murder. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury, on its own initiative or sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, either based on a killing occurring in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, or based on a killing arising from unreasonable self-defense.
Wickersham held that the evidence was insufficient to support an instruction by the trial court on voluntary manslaughter. It reiterated the holding of Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal. 3d 703, that a trial court must, sua sponte, instruct on a lesser included offense when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present, regardless of the defendant's theory of the case, but that the trial court need not instruct on a defense that is inconsistent with the defendant's theory at trial. Then, in addressing the defendant's contention that the trial court was obligated to instruct the jury sua sponte on unreasonable self-defense, Wickersham stated, without explanation, that "unreasonable self-defense comes within Sedeno's category of 'defenses' for purposes of the obligation to instruct sua sponte." ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at p. 329.) This language from Wickersham was described by the Court of Appeal in the case now before us as "inexplicable and inconsistent with the theories and rationales developed in Sedeno." We agree.
Contrary to the statement in Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at p. 329, "unreasonable self-defense" is, as we explained earlier, not a true defense; rather, it is a shorthand description of one form of voluntary manslaughter. And voluntary manslaughter, whether it arises from unreasonable self-defense or from a killing during a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, is not a defense but a crime; more precisely, it is a lesser offense included in the crime of murder. Accordingly, when a defendant is charged with murder the trial court's duty to instruct sua sponte, or on its own initiative, on unreasonable self-defense is the same as its duty to instruct on any other lesser included offense: this duty arises whenever the evidence is such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant killed the victim in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense.
We therefore disapprove Wickersham's inaccurate assertion that "unreasonable self-defense" is a "defense." ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal. 3d at p. 329.) This does not mean, however, that trial courts must instruct sua sponte on unreasonable self-defense in every murder case. Rather, the need to do so arises only when there is substantial evidence that the defendant killed in unreasonable self-defense, not when the evidence is "minimal and insubstantial." ( People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal. 3d at p. 684.
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