Broadwater v. Dorsey11/6/1995
t 125-27 (emphasis added). In the case sub judice, the son was, and had for years been, an adult. The parents no longer had any legal authority over, and no legal responsibility for, him.
The Rounds cases are, I believe, the seminal negligent entrustment cases in Maryland. The holdings in the subsequent cases, i.e., Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 431 A.2d 76 (1981), relied on extensively by the majority, are based on the Rounds cases. The son, to whom the mother entrusted the automobile in Rounds, was a minor. As I read Rounds I and II, the nonowner father was held liable because he, as a father, had the right to control his son, precisely because the son was a minor, and not because he had any power to control the automobile. He had no such power -- he did not own it. In the case sub judice, neither parent owned the vehicle involved in the accident and, thus, could not rely on ownership to exercise continuing control thereof. As the son was an adult, the parents had no authority, legal right, or power to control his operation of the automobile at issue, or any other automobile for that matter.
Following Rounds I and II, the next significant negligent entrustment case before the Court of Appeals that involved the parent/child aspect of the tort was Kahlenberg v. Goldstein, supra, 290 Md. 477, relied on extensively by the majority. There, a 20-year-old son was involved in the accident giving rise to the cause of action. At the very beginning of its opinion, the Court of Appeals felt it important to note: "The 'age of majority' was not reduced to 18 years until July 1, 1973 by Chapter 651 of the Acts of that year." 290 Md. at 479 n.1. The accident occurred in 1971. An inference that can be made from the Court's note is that it felt that the age of majority, and, thus, the minor status of the son was of some significance in its resolution of the matter. Under the expansive view espoused by the majority, the age of majority has no significance in a negligent entrustment case involving a parent/child relationship.
Of special significance in the Court's Kahlenberg opinion was its discussion of Rounds I and II. The Court opined that the Rounds Courts had responded to the contention that no liability existed as to the father because the car was not titled in the father's name. It especially noted that the Rounds Courts had, at least in part, predicated their rulings on the fact that the father had the power to control his minor son. After quoting relevant portions of the Rounds opinions, the Kahlenberg Court noted that the Rounds I discussion, relating to the power of the father to control the son,
was in the context of whether the father could be a supplier . . . when the father could be found to have the requisite knowledge for negligent entrustment. Although he may not have directly furnished the car . . ., and although the father may not have been the owner of the automobile, his right to permit and power to prohibit. . . effectively made him a supplier at that time.
290 Md. at 491 (emphasis added).
As I interpret the Kahlenberg Court's opinion, it held that, under the facts there presented, the jury could find that the father had "supplied" the car to his son because he had the right to control the actions of his minor son at the time of the accident and that once he had knowledge of the son's dangerous propensities that knowledge set in motion the "entrustor's chain of causation." The Court of Appeals, I believe, later made clear the language of Kahlenberg and the Rounds cases in terms of a limitation on the tort when it reversed us in Neale v. Wright, 322 Md. 8, 585 A.2d 196 (1991).
In Wright v. Neale, 79 Md. App. 20, 5
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