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Collyer v. State12/11/1995
BUSTAMANTE, Judge.
1. Robert Collyer appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of certiorari directing the Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) to treat his criminal conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI) as a "first offense" rather than as a "subsequent offense." We conclude that the MVD is statutorily required to abide by the legal significance of final adjudications concerning the status of an offender issued by a court pursuant to a plea bargain. We reverse the district court and remand for issuance of the writ.
2. Facts and Proceedings. Collyer was charged with DWI under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (Cum. Supp. 1993) (effective until Jan. 1, 1994), in August 1993. Collyer had been convicted of DWI once before and he was aware that a second conviction would result in mandatory revocation of his driver's license. See NMSA 1978, § 66-5-29(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1993). Collyer's employment required him to maintain his driver's license. He entered into plea negotiations with the State and agreed to plead "no contest" to the charge and pay all fines if the conviction was adjudicated as a first offense so that the mandatory revocation provisions would not apply. The magistrate court accepted the plea in May 1994, and in its judgment and sentence expressly provided that "the conviction is . . . a 'first conviction' within the meaning of Section 66-8-102 . . . and shall be treated as such for all lawful purposes."
3. As required under NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-135 (Cum. Supp. 1993) (effective until Jan. 1, 1994), the magistrate court sent an abstract to the MVD showing Collyer's conviction. Contrary to the requirements of Section 66-8-135(B)(7) the abstract does not appear to state whether the status of the "defendant was a first or subsequent offender[.]" However, the MVD also apparently was provided a copy of the judgment and the plea agreement. Because the MVD had a record of Collyer's prior conviction, it designated Collyer as a "subsequent offender," and suspended his license pending revocation. Collyer petitioned the district court asserting that the MVD did not have the authority to ignore the legal significance of the judgment and arguing that the State was bound by the plea agreement struck by the district attorney (the DA). The district court denied the writ and, in the letter explaining its decision, agreed with the State's argument that "the District Attorney does not have the power to bind the Motor Vehicle Division, which is under a statutory obligation to impose certain restrictions on driving privileges. The MVD was not privy to the plea agreement, and the agreement cannot prevent the MVD from performing its statutory duties. It is not clear, from the language of the agreement itself, that the MVD was intended to be bound by the plea agreement."
4. The MVD is Bound by Judgments of Conviction for DWI. While the State has argued assiduously that a district attorney cannot bind the MVD with a plea agreement, we conclude that two independent lines of authority support Collyer's entitlement to the writ. First, the State's focus on the abstract and the authority of MVD ignores the magistrate court's judgment and the superior authority of the judicial branch. Once a plea agreement has been accepted by a court of competent jurisdiction, it becomes merged in the judgment of conviction. See SCRA 1986, 6-502(D)(3) (Repl. 1995) (providing that if a magistrate court accepts a plea agreement, it must inform defendant that the plea agreement will be embodied in the judgment and sentence). The judgment of conviction represents not the authority of the district attorney, but the final authority of the State. It is that judgment, and not the plea agreeme
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