Long v. Coates12/11/1990
ed P. Ins. Co., 48 Wash. App. 759, 761, 740 P.2d 894, review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1009 (1987).
If doubt exists as to coverage under an insurance policy, the language will be interpreted against the insurance company and in favor of coverage. The term "resident" of a household has been interpreted in numerous cases. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 38 Wash. App. 6, 9, 684 P.2d 744, review denied, 102 Wash. 2d 1015 (1984); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., Ltd. v. Federated Am. Ins. Co., 13 Wash. App. 7, 12, 534 P.2d 48 (1975); see generally Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d 420 (1979 & Supp. 1990); Annot., 96 A.L.R. 3d 804 (1979 & Supp. 1990). Generally, the courts have found children who are away at school with the intention of returning to the family home, and children in military service who have not acquired a separate household, remain residents of the parental household. Pierce v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 29 Wash. App. 32, 37, 627 P.2d 152, review denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1032 (1981). Pierce, at 38, identified four factors relevant to a determination of residence:
(1) the intent of the departing person, (2) the formality or informality of the relationship between the person and the members of the household, (3) the relative propinquity of the dwelling units, and (4) the existence of another place of lodging.
Mr. Coates had stated he intended to pursue a military career. State Farm argues these statements create a genuine issue of material fact, citing Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 78 N.C. App. 653, 338 S.E. 2d 145 (1986). Even interpreted in a light most favorable to State Farm, those statements do not support an inference Mr. Coates had any near term intention to establish a new residence. In Great Am. Ins. Co., the son's statement he did not intend to return to his family's residence after his enlistment was held to create an issue of fact.
The evidence showed Mr. Coates had lived continuously with his mother, except for a period of about 6 months during the year before his departure for boot camp. Even during that 6-month period, when he shared an apartment with a friend, Mr. Coates returned home frequently for brief visits, meals, and to do laundry. He was an integrated member of the household. There was no evidence he had any other permanent residence or that he intended to acquire one. Mr. Coates was between duty stations; he had no residence other than his mother's. Interpreting the evidence in a light most favorable to the insurance company, but interpreting the term "residence" to favor coverage, the trial court properly concluded Mr. Coates was a resident of his mother's household as a matter of law.
Following a bench trial, the court found the stabbing of Mr. Long fell outside the exclusion of "bodily injury or property damage which is expected or intended by the insured" from coverage under the policy. State Farm contends this is in error. Although various states have interpreted this clause differently, the majority of jurisdictions hold it applies only if the insured intended both the act and to cause some kind of bodily injury. Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 703, 278 N.W. 2d 898 (1979); see Annot., Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957, 983-88 (1984 & Supp. 1990). Western Nat'l Assur. Co. v. Hecker, 43 Wash. App. 816, 825, 719 P.2d 954<
Page 1 2 3 4 Washington DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|