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Long v. Coates12/11/1990
h there was conflicting testimony from expert witnesses, toxicologist Raymond Davis testified Mr. Coates' blood alcohol level was about .24 percent at the time of the stabbing and he was severely intoxicated. According to Mr. Davis, Mr. Coates would have been temporarily deprived of reasoning, judgment, cognition, perception, and discrimination. Dr. Thomas Dillon, a psychiatrist, testified that individuals with blood alcohol levels well above .1 percent will be so impaired they are unable to form an intent. The trial court found Mr. Coates' mental capacities were temporarily eliminated at the time of the stabbing and he did not intend to stab anyone.
Whether intoxication rendered the insured incapable of forming an intent is a question for the trier of fact. Morgan, 368 S.E. 2d at 510; Morris, at 1212; see Brannan, at 348-49. The trial court found Mr. Coates "did not expect or intend to stab anyone, especially Mr. Long". This finding is supported by the court's summary of testimony by numerous witnesses, set forth in the findings of fact, showing Mr. Coates was extremely intoxicated, and the level of intoxication was sufficient to prevent his forming a rational intent. These findings are in turn supported by the record.
State Farm nevertheless argues intent may be inferred, as a matter of law, from the commission of a wrongful act, citing Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash. 2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 51 Wash. App. 591, 754 P.2d 1038, review denied, 111 Wash. 2d 1018 (1988); Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rash, 48 Wash. App. 701, 740 P.2d 370 (1987); and Western Nat'l Assur. Co. v. Hecker, supra. In each of those cases, the insured admitted intending, or was found to have intended, the injurious act; the issue was whether intent to injure could be inferred from commission of an intentional act. Because intent both to commit the act and to cause some injury are required to bring this case within the exclusion, and because the court found Mr. Coates lacked intent to commit the act, whether intent to harm may be inferred from the act is irrelevant.
State Farm argues even if intoxication could prevent Mr. Coates from forming an intent to harm, the injury was nevertheless "expected" and therefore falls within the exclusionary clause, citing Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murry, 54 Ill. App. 3d 459, 370 N.E. 2d 295, 299 (1977). A subsequent Illinois decision, however, expressly rejects the objective standard enunciated in Murry. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Dichtl, 78 Ill. App. 3d 970, 398 N.E. 2d 582, 587-88 (1979).
Other jurisdictions have reached differing results on the issue of whether "expected" and "intended", as used in an exclusion of coverage, are synonymous, and those jurisdictions holding the terms are not synonymous have used various definitions of the term "expected". See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R. 4th at 981-83, 999-1002 (1984 & Supp. 1990). Washington courts have not addressed this issue nor do we. The trial court found Mr. Coates did not intend the act of stabbing Mr. Long. The evidence supports that finding. That finding, whether he expected or intended to cause harm, thereby is irrelevant.
We affirm.
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