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State v. Desilva12/9/1998 ard." State v. Jacobs, 504 So.2d 817 (La. 1987).
The defendant was charged with second degree murder and convicted of manslaughter. Second degree murder is defined in part by La. R.S. 14:30.1 as "the killing of a human being (1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or (2) (a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of . . . armed robbery . . . even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." It is unclear under which subsection the State proceeded because the defendant was initially charged with first degree murder, which required both the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and that the killing be committed during the perpetration of armed robbery. It is unclear which element the State dropped when reducing the charge to second degree murder. The jury convicted her of manslaughter, which is defined by La. R.S. 14:31 as either a homicide which would be first or second degree murder but is committed in sudden passion or the heat of blood, or as a killing committed without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enunciated in the first or second degree murder statutes or any intentional misdemeanor "directly affecting the person." Although the jury returned a responsive verdict, sufficient evidence to support the charged offense is deemed sufficient to support a responsive verdict, whether or not the evidence actually fits the elements of the responsive verdict, as long as the defendant did not object to the inclusion of the responsive verdict. See State ex rel. Elaire v. Blackburn, 424 So.2d 246 (La. 1982) ; State v. Schrader, 518 So.2d 1024 (La. 1988); State v. Bowman, 95-0667 p. 10, fn. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/10/96), 677 So.2d 1094, 1100 . Here, there is no indication the defendant objected to the inclusion of manslaughter as a responsive verdict. Thus, if the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder, her conviction must be affirmed.
All of the evidence presented at trial, including Ms. Benjamin's statement, indicated the gun was in Ms. Benjamin's hand when Hecker was shot. Thus, the State had to prove that the defendant was a principal to the shooting. In State v. Richardson, 96-2598 p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/17/97), 703 So.2d 1371, 1374, this court discussed the proof of guilt as a principal:
La. R.S. 14:24 provides:
`All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.' In order to support a defendant's conviction as a principal, the State must show that the defendant had the requisite mental state for the crime." State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714 (La. 1987), cert. denied, Brooks v. Louisiana, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 337, 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987); State v. Hampton, 94-1943 (La.App. 4th Cir. 12/27/96), 686 So.2d 1021, writ denied, 97-0166 (La. 6/13/97), 695 So.2d 986.
The defendant argues the State failed to prove she had either the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on the victim, or that she had the intent to participate in an armed robbery of the victim which resulted in the victim's death. The evidence introduced at trial did not prove her intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Thus, this Court must determine whether there was evidence to show her intent to participate in the armed robbery that resulted in the victim's death.
The defendant argues the ev
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