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State v. Lear12/22/1998
Reporter of Decisions
Submitted on Briefs: November 6, 1998
David A. Lear appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Kravchuk, C.J.) affirming the judgment entered in the District Court (Bangor, Hjelm, J.) after a conditional guilty plea on the charge of operating under the influence, in violation of 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2411 (1996 & Supp. 1998), a Class D offense. Lear contends that the court (Bangor, Anderson, J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
On the evening of November 30, 1996, Trooper Brian Strout of the Maine State Police participated in a roadblock on Route 1A in East Holden. At approximately 11:30 p.m., Strout saw Lear's approaching motor vehicle safely make a U-turn and reverse direction approximately 200 yards from the roadblock. Strout got into his cruiser and pursued the vehicle. After continuing about one half mile on Route 1A, the vehicle turned left on Church Road, and progressed for about one quarter mile before turning onto Roques Bluff Road and immediately into Lear's driveway. Strout displayed his blue lights and flashers during the entire distance he pursued Lear's vehicle. Strout caught up with the vehicle for a portion of the distance, but the vehicle did not promptly stop, despite the trooper's signal to do so.
As Lear and a female passenger walked toward Lear's house, Strout intercepted them and asked Lear to produce his operator's license. Lear produced a conditional license prohibiting him from operating a motor vehicle after consuming any amount of intoxicating liquor. Strout smelled an odor of alcohol emanating from Lear and observed that Lear had glassy eyes and slurred speech. He then ordered Lear to get into his police cruiser and asked Lear if he would submit to a test to determine his blood alcohol level. Lear responded: "I'm f---ed if I do and I'm f---ed if I don't."
Lear pled not guilty to the Class D offense of operating under the influence in violation of 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2411, and filed a motion to suppress based upon an allegedly improper investigatory stop and failure to administer Miranda warnings. The motion court concluded that "Officer Strout did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the stop of [Lear's] vehicle based solely on his making a U-turn 200 yards from the roadblock." However, the court found that Strout: (1) was justified in stopping Lear based upon a reasonable articulable suspicion that Lear violated 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 (1996) by refusing to stop for a law enforcement officer; and (2) was not conducting an interrogation at the time Lear made the statement at issue. The court also concluded that Strout had probable cause to arrest Lear based on a reasonable belief that Lear had violated both 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 and the terms of his conditional license. Lear appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment of the District Court, and now appeals to this court.
I.
An officer is justified in making an investigatory stop if, at the time of the stop: (1) the officer has an "articulable suspicion" of criminal activity; and (2) such suspicion is "objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances." State v. Brown, 1997 ME 90, 5, 694 A.2d 453, 455 (quotations omitted). "The court must find that the officer actually entertained the suspicion and that the suspicion was reasonable under the circumstances." State v. Dean, 645 A.2d 634, 635 (Me. 1994) (quoting State v. Worster, 611 A.2d 979, 980 (Me. 1992)) (emphasis added). Therefore, an analysis of the propriety of an investigatory detention short of formal arrest necessarily invo
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