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State v. Lear12/22/1998
lves both a subjective component (i.e., actual articulable suspicion) and an objective component (i.e., reasonable suspicion). See id. Hence, the term "reasonable and articulable suspicion" includes both subjective and objective components. See id.
We review both the subjective and objective components of a trial court's finding that an officer possessed the "reasonable and articulable suspicion" necessary to support an investigatory detention of a motor vehicle under a "clear error" standard. See Brown, 1997 ME 90, 5, 694 A.2d at 455. Lear does not contest the court's factual finding that Strout actually had a subjective "articulable suspicion" of criminal activity. Rather, he contends that Strout's articulable suspicion of criminal activity was objectively unreasonable, based on the undisputed facts. Therefore, the only issue is whether the court committed clear error when it found that Strout's suspicion of criminal activity was objectively reasonable.
The court found that Strout's suspicion of criminal activity based solely on Lear's U-turn was not objectively reasonable. However, the court concluded that Lear's intervening failure to stop independently provided Strout with an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, because 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 prohibits a person from failing or refusing to stop a motor vehicle "on request or signal of a uniformed law enforcement officer." 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414. Lear does not contest the court's finding that Strout caught up with Lear during Lear's retreat from the roadblock and that Lear "did not promptly stop, despite the trooper's signal to do so." By failing to stop for a police officer, Lear violated 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414 (a class E crime), and thereby provided Strout with an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414(2). Therefore, the court did not commit clear error when it concluded that Strout's articulable suspicion of criminal activity (i.e., Lear's violation of 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2414) was objectively reasonable.
II.
The court also held that Miranda v. Arizona did not require suppressing Lear's response to Strout's request that he submit to a blood alcohol test because, although Lear was in custody, his gratuitous response was not the product of an interrogation. Lear contends that the court erroneously denied his motion to suppress, because he claims his statement was the product of a custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda.
"A Miranda warning is required only if a defendant is in custody and subject to interrogation." State v. Swett, 1998 ME 76, 4, 709 A.2d 729, 730. The Miranda rule does not apply to spontaneous statements that are not a response to interrogation. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 (1990). As the court noted, 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2457 (1996) authorized Strout to require Lear to take a test to determine Lear's blood alcohol level. It is clear from the record that Strout merely made a routine request for Lear to submit to a blood alcohol test pursuant to 29p;A M.R.S.A. § 2457, and did not elicit incriminating information or admissions. Therefore, Lear was not "subject to interrogation," and the court did not erroneously deny his motion to suppress. Swett, 1998 ME 76, 4, 709 A.2d at 730.
The entry is: Judgment affirmed.
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