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State v. Dumas12/15/1998
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court's dismissal of gross misdemeanor DWI and test refusal charges. Appellant asserts the district court erred in determining that Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(c)(2), violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.
FACTS
The legislature, in 1997, enacted certain amendments to the DWI and implied consent statutes. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.121, 169.123 (1997). These amendments, in certain situations, convert misdemeanor DWI and misdemeanor refusal-to-test offenses into gross misdemeanors. See id. At issue in this appeal is the enhancement of a current DWI offense that occurred within five years of an implied consent license revocation under Minn. Stat. § 169.123.
In November 1995, respondent William Michael Dumas had his license revoked under Minn. Stat. § 169.123. On January 7, 1998, respondent was charged with DWI and test refusal offenses in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(c)(2). Because respondent's license had been revoked under Minn. Stat. § 169.123 within five years prior to these offenses, the DWI and test refusal offenses were enhanced from misdemeanors to gross misdemeanors.
The district court ruled that use of respondent's implied consent license revocation to enhance the DWI and test refusal charges to gross misdemeanors violates respondent's right to counsel, and that Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(c)(2), when applied to an implied consent revocation that took place before the amendments to Minn. Stat. § 169.121 were enacted, is an unconstitutional ex post facto law.
ISSUES
1. Does using an implied consent license revocation to enhance subsequent DWI-related charges from misdemeanors to gross misdemeanors violate respondent's constitutional right to counsel?
2. Does Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(c)(2), violate the ex post facto clauses of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions by enhancing present DWI-related charges to gross misdemeanors based on an implied consent license revocation that took place before the enactment of the statute?
ANALYSIS
The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, and as such, appellate courts are not bound by the Conclusions of the district courts. In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn. 1993), aff'd, 494 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1993). Statutes are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, and those challenging otherwise valid statutes must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute violates a claimed right. Id. (emphasis added). In considering the constitutionality of a statute, " very presumption is invoked in favor of the constitutionality of the statute." Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn. 1979). Moreover, the, "power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution and only when absolutely necessary." In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989).
I.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the United States Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to any criminal case in which there is a possibility of incarceration. 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S. Ct. 2006, 2012 (1972). After Argersinger, there must be a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel in any case in which a person may be imprisoned for an offense classified as "petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless [that person] was represented by counsel at his trial." Id. The court reasoned that:
"counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of goin
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