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State v. Dumas12/15/1998
Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991). The issue in an implied consent proceeding is whether a defendant refused to submit to chemical testing, which is decided by a preponderance of the evidence standard. Eckstein v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 471 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Aug. 1, 1991). If the court finds the defendant refused testing, the defendant's license is revoked. In no case does incarceration result from these proceedings. While the act of test refusal is itself a crime, it must be prosecuted in a separate action. Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that, while revocation may appear punitive, implied consent license revocations are remedial in nature. State v. Hanson, 543 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn. 1996) ("Any punitive effect is merely incidental to the statute's overriding remedial purpose.").
Respondent makes no claim that he did not receive the assistance of counsel when, in 1995, he refused to consent to testing. We are required to invoke every presumption in favor of constitutionality. Because the earlier proceeding is civil in nature, we conclude the rationale of Host applies, and respondent was afforded all the process he was due in the implied consent proceeding.
Respondent also argues that this court's holding in State v. Friedrich, 436 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. App. 1989), is controlling precedent. In Friedrich, the defendants first pleaded guilty to DWI-related offenses in Wisconsin. 436 N.W.2d at 476. In Wisconsin, the first driving while intoxicated offense leads to only civil forfeiture of money, and there is no right to counsel in the proceedings. See id.; see also Novak, 107 Wis.2d 31, 41-42, 318 N.W.2d at 370. Both defendants were without counsel and did not waive their right to counsel on the record in the Wisconsin proceedings. Friedrich, 436 N.W.2d at 476. Both defendants were subsequently charged with DWI-related offenses in Minnesota. Id. The Friedrich court held that the prior convictions could not be used to enhance the subsequent Minnesota charges because the prior convictions were obtained without counsel and without valid waiver of counsel on the record. Id. at 478. The court reasoned that these convictions did not comport with Minnesota's procedural safeguards and thus, could not be used to enhance subsequent charges. Id. at 477.
As in Nordstrom, the Friedrich court did not address whether only those findings obtained in violation of a defendant's rights under the Minnesota Constitution were prohibited from enhancing subsequent charges. Moreover, while the Wisconsin adjudications appear to have been primarily civil in nature, the Friedrich court did not rely on the civil/criminal distinction in reaching its Conclusion. Again, because we must presume a challenged statute is constitutional, the holding in Friedrich does not require that we strike down the statute at issue.
In Conclusion, we are not convinced that Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(c)(2), is unconstitutional. There is no allegation that the civil license forfeiture used to enhance respondent's charge in this case was obtained in violation of respondent's constitutional rights. Moreover, we cannot conclude from the language used that the holding in Nordstrom was intended to apply to all situations in which the past finding was uncounseled. We therefore conclude respondent has failed to demonstrate that Minn. Stat. § 169.121, subd. 3(c)(2), is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
II.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. U.S. Const. art. I, §10; Minn. Const. art. I, §11. An ex post facto law applies to events occurring before its enactment, and
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