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Woirhaye v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court12/23/1998 ourt, the only remedy under the statute would be appeal and trial de novo before a Judge, not a jury, in district court. This results in the very real possibility that a misdemeanor criminal defendant may be granted no valid jury trial at all.
. The State cites North Central Services, Inc. v. Hafdahl (1981), 191 Mont. 440, 625 P.2d 56, as authority in support of the constitutionality of § 46-17-201(3), MCA. Hafdahl involved a challenge to the small claims court procedure established under Title 25, Chapter 35, MCA (1979). That statutory procedure made no provision for a jury trial in small claims court. This Court stated in that opinion that the constitutional right to trial by jury was satisfied if it was granted at the district court level, though denied at the small claims level. Hafdahl, 191 Mont. at 444, 625 P.2d at 58.
. That language, however, is dicta and not the basis for the holding in Hafdahl. The critical holding on the jury trial issue in Hafdahl hinged on the statutory provision that an appeal from small claims court was limited to questions of law and was not a trial de novo in district court. This Court held that because appeals from small claims court were limited to questions of law, the statute unconstitutionally violated the right to jury trial by effectively denying the right to trial by jury at all levels. Hafdahl, 191 Mont. at 444-45, 625 P.2d at 59.
. It is clear to this Court that under Montana's Constitution, a defendant has an absolute right not to be convicted of a misdemeanor by less than a unanimous jury. Section 46-17-201(3), MCA, however, forces a misdemeanor defendant to be convicted by a Judge, either in Justice court or in district court, rather than by a unanimous jury.
. We decline to follow the dicta in Hafdahl that the right to trial by jury is satisfied if it is granted at the district court level although denied at the small claims court level, and we will not follow the dicta in Hafdahl in future cases. We hold that because it impinges upon rights guaranteed under the Montana Constitution, § 46-17-201(3), MCA, is unconstitutional and therefore must be stricken from the laws of this State. For the same reason, the provisions of Chapter 129, L. 1997, which have been codified at §§ 46-7-102(1)(g) and 46-17-311(1), MCA, are stricken as well.
. It is so Ordered.
J. A. TURNAGE
We concur: JAMES C. NELSON KARLA M. GRAY TERRY N. TRIEWEILER JIM REGNIER W. WILLIAM LEAPHART WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.
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