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State v. Meyer12/16/1998
ific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted the officer in believing that the area to be swept harbored an individual posing a danger to the officers. This is a correct statement of the doctrine but is not factually applicable here. The State now claims the individual who posed a threat to the officers was Kuntz. It is noteworthy that Locke indicated that at the time of the sweep, he did not know from whom they were protecting themselves. As we have stated before, it was not reasonable for the officers to believe Kuntz was present at 502 North Congress. Moreover, the State cannot justify the protective sweep with Coreau's arrest. Coreau clearly was no threat as he had been removed from the house and was handcuffed on the front porch. Furthermore, Buie can be distinguished from this case. The protective sweep in Buie was conducted in Buie's own home after police had obtained an arrest warrant for him and after they had called his house to verify that he was home. Id. at 328, 110 SCt at 1095, 108 LEd2d at 282. The Buie protective sweep did not involve a search of a third party's home and is inapplicable in this case.
CONCLUSION
[ ] An arrest warrant and a search warrant are safeguards of individual rights. These processes serve a gate keeping purpose. They protect individuals from unnecessary intrusions by the government. In this case the purpose of the arrest warrant for Kuntz was to protect him from unlawful seizure. The arrest warrant for Kuntz did not serve to protect Victoria from the unreasonable search of her home. From that rationale, the arrest warrant for Coreau did not serve to protect Victoria, either. Because Kuntz' and Coreau's arrest warrants only addressed their individual interests, the search of Victoria's home was not reasonable.
"Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home. This analysis, however, is plainly inapplicable when the police seek to use an arrest warrant as legal authority to enter the home of a third party to conduct a search. Such a warrant embodies no judicial determination whatsoever regarding the person whose home is to be searched. Because it does not authorize the police to deprive the third person of his liberty, it cannot embody any derivative authority to deprive this person of his interest in the privacy of his home. Such a deprivation must instead be based on an independent showing that a legitimate object of a search is located in the third party's home. We have consistently held, however, that such a determination is the province of the magistrate, and not that of the police officer." Steagald, 451 US at 214-15, n7, 101 SCt at 1648-49, n7, 68 LEd2d at 46-7, n7.
[ ] In sum, we hold that absent an exception to the rule, a law enforcement officer may not legally search for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court we find the court did not err in granting Victoria's motion to suppress the evidence.
[ ] We affirm.
[ ] MILLER, Chief Justice, and SABERS, AMUNDSON and KONENKAMP, Justices, concur.
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