Hennessey v. Superior Court6/12/1997
GRANT, Judge
Petitioner, Patrick J. Hennessey ("Defendant"), filed a petition for special action alleging the Superior Court, acting in its appellate capacity, violated Rule 8.2(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to reverse the municipal court's denial of his Motion to Dismiss. Respondent, the State of Arizona (the "state"), disagrees with Defendant's Conclusions in his petition but also requests that this court accept jurisdiction of this special action. By previous order we accepted jurisdiction with an opinion to follow. This is that opinion.
SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION
This court does not generally accept special action review of a denial of a motion to dismiss. Maricopa County v. Superior Court, 170 Ariz. 248, 250-51, 823 P.2d 696, 698-99 (App. 1991). Because this case originated in city court, our jurisdictional analysis must begin with Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated ("A.R.S.") section 22-375 (1988). That section limits the scope of our direct appellate jurisdiction over superior court judgments in actions originating in inferior courts to claims that challenge the validity of a statute or a tax. See, e.g., State v. Aguilar, 170 Ariz. 292, 294, 823 P.2d 1300, 1302 (App. 1991). This court cannot enlarge its jurisdiction by granting or denying review in a Rule 32 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that originated in city court and that sets forth issues over which we would not have direct appellate jurisdiction. However, under Aguilar, special action review is appropriate "when section 22-375 prevents an appellant from raising an issue . . . ." Id. at 295, 833 P.2d at 1303. Further, A.R.S. section 12-120.21(A)(4) (1974) allows us to "hear and determine petitions for special actions brought pursuant to the rules of procedure for special actions, without regard to appellate jurisdiction." This framework, along with the statewide importance and likelihood of recurrence of the matter, see State ex rel. Bowers, 173 Ariz. 34, 38, 839 P.2d 454, 458 (App. 1992), justifies our acceptance of special action jurisdiction. By accepting special action jurisdiction, we may guide the trial courts in ruling on similar cases in the future.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was originally arrested on February 10, 1994, for Driving under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor ("DUI"). Defendant, who was driving with a suspended license due to a prior DUI conviction, was booked into the Maricopa County Jail for felony DUI. The felony charge was "scratched" in the Justice court because the County Attorney's Office failed to file a felony criminal complaint.
The City of Phoenix Prosecutor's Office ("the city") subsequently filed the matter as a Class One Misdemeanor on April 13, 1994, and a summons was issued on April 18, 1994. Rather than sending a copy of the complaint and summons to Defendant's Fourteenth Avenue address, the city sent the summons to an address at Fourteenth Street. Defendant's correct address, however, was listed as Fourteenth Avenue on the Alcohol Influence Report, the Booking Slip, the Implied Consent Form and the Supplemental Police Report.
When Defendant failed to appear at his arraignment on May 11, 1994, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Defendant had no knowledge of the misdemeanor charge until eighteen months later, in October 1995, when he attempted to have his driver's license reinstated by the Department of Motor Vehicles. After being notified of the misdemeanor complaint, Defendant voluntarily appeared for arraignment on the DUI charges in Phoenix Municipal Court on November 6, 1995, at which time the warrant was quashed. At that time, Defendant still had not been formal
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