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EDGE v. STATE5/28/1997
c) states that DOT enforcement officers have the full authority of peace officers while in the performance of their duties. OCGA § 17-4-23 (a) provides, without geographical limitation, that a law enforcement officer is authorized to arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation of a vehicle by issuing a citation where the offense is committed in his presence. See OCGA § 17-4-23 (a); Glazner v. State, 170 Ga. App. 810, 811 (318 S.E.2d 233) (1984). McDuffie's authority to arrest Edge was, therefore, contained in "other law," namely OCGA § 17-4-23. We also point out that even a private person can make an arrest for an offense committed in his presence. See Wells v. State, 206 Ga. App. 513 (426 S.E.2d 231) (1992); OCGA § 17-4-60.
Edge relies upon a 1978 opinion of the attorney general which opines that the arrest powers of DOT enforcement officers do not extend beyond those specifically enumerated in what is now OCGA § 32-6-29. See 1978 Op. Atty. Gen. No. 78-73. We are not persuaded by the conclusion reached in that opinion which, in our view, fails to give proper emphasis to the statutory provision that DOT enforcement officers have the full authority of peace officers and any powers created by any other law. See OCGA § 32-6-29 (b), (c). Moreover, in the opinion, which was written nearly 20 years ago, the attorney general did not address, and probably did not contemplate, the situation presented here. Interestingly, in May 1996, the Governor of the State of Georgia issued an executive order, referencing this same 1978 opinion of the attorney general, specifically conferring upon DOT enforcement officers the authority to enforce travel restrictions in HOV lanes, including the issuance of citations for such violations.
3. Edge claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after McDuffie testified that the HGN test results indicated
a blood-alcohol concentration of over .10 percent when, according to Edge, HGN testing has not evolved to the point it can be used to ascertain specific blood-alcohol content. Assuming there was error, Edge failed to preserve the issue because, after the court gave curative instructions, Edge did not request further curative instructions or renew his motion for mistrial. See D'Angelo v. State, 223 Ga. App. 558, 560 (2) (479 S.E.2d 384) (1996).
Judgment affirmed. Pope, P.J., and Blackburn, J., concur.
DECIDED MAY 28, 1997.
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