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Hughes v. State6/17/1997
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: And who filled that document out?
: I did.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: And on Question No. 18, which is part of the preprinted booking information, did you ask the defendant whether or not he was a narcotics or drug user?
: Yes.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: And what was his response?
: No, he was not."
The prosecutor later used the petitioner's response that he was not a drug user to support the charge that the petitioner intended to distribute, as opposed to consume, the cocaine in his possession. In closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to consider the significance of the defendant's response as follows:
"You also have a statement that was made during the booking process by the defendant that he doesn't use drugs. Well, you may consider that however you wish. You can ignore it totally if you want to, whatever you want to do, but I think that that is -- you can take that into consideration. If he says he doesn't use drugs, then he presumptively didn't have this for his own personal use, he intended to do something with it, or if you decide that because he was being booked at that time that maybe he wasn't telling the whole story, that's fine, but even without that statement, you certainly have a quantity of drugs with the surrounding circumstances that indicate that he in fact intended to sell it or give it away."
On appeal of his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals, the petitioner asserted that the trial court erred in permitting Officer Morrissette to testify regarding the negative response to the drug use question on the arrest intake form. The intermediate appellate court held that the question fell within the routine booking question exception to Miranda, and it found no error by the trial judge in admitting the testimony.
II.
A.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court concluded that proper protection of the privilege against self-incrimination requires the adoption of certain procedural safeguards in the context of custodial interrogation. Specifically, the Court held that an individual in police custody must be warned, prior to any interrogation, "that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney," either retained or appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726. Absent a knowing and voluntary waiver of these rights, any incriminating responses to police questioning are inadmissible against the detained individual at subsequent criminal proceedings. Id.
The obligation to give Miranda warnings arises whenever an individual is subjected to "custodial interrogation." See Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 374, 402 A.2d 900, 903 (1979)(observing that "in order to be subject to the Miranda warnings, statements must flow from a 'custodial interrogation' within the meaning of Miranda"). In the years since this landmark decision, however, a number of exceptions to Miranda's requirements have been recognized. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984)(public safety exception).
One such exception to Miranda's requirements is referenced by the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990). It is known as the routine booking question exception. At issue in Muniz was a series of questions posed, without Miranda warnings, to one Inocencio Muniz who was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 585, 110 S. Ct. at 2642
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