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Hughes v. State6/17/1997
tion based solely on the actual intent of the police officer in posing the question, while the latter restricts the exception based on an objective assessment of the likelihood, in light of both the context of the questioning and the content of the question, that the question will elicit an incriminating response.
The distinction between the two standards has gone largely unremarked upon in post-Muniz discussions of the routine booking question exception. See, e.g., DAVID M. NISSMAN AND ED HAGEN, LAW OF CONFESSIONS § 5.13 at 5-22 (2d ed. 1994)(stating, without qualification, that "the [routine booking question] exception was formally adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v[.] Muniz"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7 at 327 (2d ed. 1992)(stating that Muniz supports lower court decisions, based on the definition of interrogation in Innis, that routine booking questions do not require Miranda warnings, but offering no discussion of the limits of the exception); see also Broadus, 7 F.3d at 460 (Muniz not mentioned in decision). Some courts, in fact, have defined the routine booking question exception in the language of Muniz, but have then employed the Innis-based standard as if the two formulations were interchangeable. For example, in Parra, supra, the court wrote:
"Where questions regarding normally routine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating information, the questioning constitutes interrogation subject to the strictures of Miranda. In this case, [the law enforcement officer] did not question [the suspect] to obtain general booking information. Rather, he questioned [the suspect] about his true name for the direct and admitted purpose of linking [the suspect] to his incriminating immigration file. Under these circumstances, the questioning was reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information relevant to establishing an essential element necessary for a conviction...." (Citation omitted)(emphasis added).
2 F.3d at 1068. Similarly disregarding the distinction, the court in People v. Rodney, supra, cited Muniz in support of the statement that the routine booking question exception does not apply "if the questions, though facially appropriate, are likely to elicit incriminating admissions...." 648 N.E.2d at 474 (emphasis added). Contributing to the lack of attention given the slight, but significant, difference in tests may be the fact that the Muniz plurality did not expressly reject the Innis-based decisions, and may also be the perception that the two approaches are not necessarily irreconcilable. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has referred to courts that use the Innis-based formulation as merely "elaborating upon the booking [question] exception" as defined in Muniz. U.S. v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 608 (4th Cir. 1994). In its review of the instant case, however, the Court of Special Appeals seemed to reject the Innis-based test and instead concluded that the principle "established" by Muniz was that "the booking exception applies to routine questions ... unless they are asked for the purpose of obtaining incriminating answers." (Emphasis added). Using this formulation of the routine booking question exception, the intermediate appellate court held the question was within the routine booking exception. We disagree.
III.
We agree that certain routine questions asked during the booking process are ordinarily exempt from the requirements of Miranda. See State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 39, 537 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1988)(stating that "'there seems to be general agreement ... that Miranda does not apply to "administrative questioning," the routine questions asked of all a
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