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Pruett v. City of Amarillo6/20/1997
JUNE 20, 1997
Mary Francis Pruett and Patrick Daniel Pruett (the Pruetts) appeal from a final summary judgement denying them recovery against the City of Amarillo (Amarillo or the City). Through one point of error, they contend that the trial court erred in granting Amarillo's motion for summary judgement because 1) they had alleged an exception to sovereign immunity, 2) an affirmative defense was not established as a matter of law, and 3) the elements of negligence were not conclusively negated. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Background
The Pruetts sued Amarillo for negligence. The claim arose from an Amarillo police officer's attempt to apprehend an individual, William Dean Wesson (Wesson), suspected of driving while intoxicated. While pursuing the suspect, the officer allegedly drove his squad car in a negligent manner which proximately caused the Pruetts to suffer injury. That is, his mode of driving caused Wesson's vehicle to collide with a car driven by Mary Pruett (Mary), according to the Pruetts. Similarly, Amarillo was also responsible for the injuries since it 1) failed to institute safe pursuit procedures, 2) failed to adequately instruct its employees on how to safely pursue another, and 3) authorized the pursuit of an individual without reasonable justification, they continued.
Once issue was joined, Amarillo moved for summary judgment. It was allegedly entitled to same because of 1) the City's sovereign immunity, 2) the absence of any duty owed by it to the Pruetts, and 3) the absence of proximate causation. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. However, the judgement subsequently entered did not specify upon which ground it relied.
Standard of Review
For a summary judgement to be granted, the movant must negate the presence of all material issues of fact and establish his right to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Miller v. Galveston/Houston Diocese, 911 S.W.2d 897, 898-99 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1995, no writ). A defendant may do this by conclusively 1) negating one or more essential elements of his opponent's cause of action or 2) proving each element of an affirmative defense. Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). Furthermore, in determining whether the defendant carried this burden, we construe the evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at 644; Miller v. Galveston/Houston Diocese, 911 S.W.2d at 899.
Next, the movant requesting judgement is free to assert as many grounds therefor as he chooses. Should he raise several and the court fail to state upon which it relied in granting relief, an additional obstacle confronts the non-movant. It falls upon the latter, on appeal, to address each ground asserted and establish why it was deficient to support judgment. Miller v. Galveston/Houston Diocese, 911 S.W.2d at 899; Lee v. Levi Strauss & Co., 897 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, no writ). Moreover, failing to do this entitles the reviewing court to affirm on any unaddressed ground. Miller v. Galveston/Houston, 911 S.W.2d at 899.
Application of Standard
At bar, recovery was sought against Amarillo through two avenues. The first involved imputation of liability via the doctrine of respondeat superior; that is, the Pruetts endeavored to impute the officer's purported negligence to Amarillo, his employer. The second entailed liability arising from the City's own supposed misfeasance in 1) neglecting to institute various procedures and instruct its policemen regarding those procedures and 2) authorizing pursuits without reasonable justification. As
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