Thomas v. Maryland12/6/1993
he same crime in other jurisdictions.
Id. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3010. The Justices cautioned that:
Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted criminals.
Id. at 290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009 (footnote omitted). Recognizing that perfect proportionality was not required, the Court condemned as unconstitutional only those sentences that are "grossly disproportionate," or "significantly disproportionate." Id. at 288, 303, 103 S.Ct. at 3008, 3016.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), a plurality decision containing five separate opinions, clouds somewhat the waters of Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence. It seems clear, however,
that a majority of the Justices continue to hold that proportionality is a component of the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Although it is argued that Harmelin narrowed Solem in some respects, it is apparent that a majority of the justices in Harmelin would go at least as far as holding that:
The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime.
Harmelin, supra, 501 U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting in part Solem, supra, 463 U.S. at 288, 303, 103 S.Ct. at 3008, 3016).
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Harmelin also states that because impermissible disproportionality will rarely be found, most cases can be resolved by a threshold comparison of the crime committed to the sentence imposed, and a more detailed comparative analysis within and between jurisdictions will be required only when the threshold comparison suggests gross disproportionality.
Intra- and inter-jurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.
The proper rule for comparative analysis of sentences, then, is to validate an initial judgment that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at 2707.
The approach outlined by Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin is consistent with the approach we earlier approved in State v. Davis, 310 Md. 611, 530 A.2d 1223 (1987). In Davis, we said that "the substantive issue of whether Davis's sentence is constitutionally proportionate also involves a question of process, namely, the breadth and depth of the required proportionality review in relation to Davis's sentence and criminal record." Id. at 628, 530 A.2d 1223. We then concluded
that "based on Davis's current and . . . predicate convictions [under a recidivist statute], on the seriousness of the crime, and on comparisons to other sentences adjudicated to be constitutional," an extensive proportionality review under Solem was not appropriate, and the sentence of life without parole was not unconstitutional. Id. at 631-32, 530 A.2d 1223.
More recently, in his concurring opinion in Minor v. State, 313 Md. 573, 546 A.2d 1028 (1988), Judge Eldridge said:
Furthermore, I do not believe that the Supreme Court's opinions require that we classify all criminal sentences into two ca
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Maryland DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|