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Taylor v. Sherrill9/25/1990
F-->13-1204 (defining aggravated assault). Similarly, to support a conviction of criminal damage under A.R.S. § 13-1602(A)(1) or (B)(3), the state must establish that Taylor recklessly caused the damage. Based upon the necessary elements of these crimes, we conclude that the state may not present evidence of either an unsafe turn or that Taylor was traveling at an excessive rate of speed in the trial for aggravated assault and criminal damage. The trial court abused its discretion in concluding that, based on Walker, double jeopardy did not attach and in denying Taylor's alternate request for relief, the preclusion of evidence of the unsafe left turn and speeding.
We note that our result in this case is distinguishable from our recent decision in Lewis v. State of Arizona, 166 Ariz. 354, 358-359, 802 P.2d 1053, 1057-1058 (App.1990) (Roll, J., dissenting). In Lewis we found that the dismissal of certain charges pursuant to a plea agreement was not a "prosecution" for purposes of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy under Grady. We cited State v. Boudreaux, 402 So.2d 629, 632 (La.1981) for the proposition that where the defendant had not been "convicted and punished . . . e was not forced to 'run the gauntlet' on that charge." However, a conviction or judgment of guilt of a traffic violation is treated the same whether rendered following an admission of responsibility, a trial on the merits, or default. See A.R.S. § 28-444(D). If a person fails to appear on a traffic complaint, ". . . allegations in the complaint shall be deemed admitted and the court shall enter judgment for this state . . . ." A.R.S. § 28-1076(D).
Conclusion
The state's petition for review is denied. Taylor's petition for special action relief is granted and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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