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People v. Frazier4/24/2003
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Taubman and Nieto, JJ., concur
In this appeal concerning the version of § 42-4-1301(9) in effect from July 1 to September 25, 2001, defendant, Scott Alan Frazier, appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court following his guilty plea to vehicular homicide. We affirm.
In August 2001, defendant was driving a motorcycle when he was involved in an accident. The victim, a passenger on the back of defendant's motorcycle, was thrown from the motorcycle and died at the scene. Defendant's blood alcohol content was determined to be 0.145 grams of alcohol per one hundred milliliters of blood.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide under § 18-3-106(1)(a) and (b), C.R.S. 2002. At the providency hearing, the trial court advised defendant that the crime of vehicular homicide committed while driving under the influence was a class three felony and that he could be sentenced to the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC) for a term between two and twenty-four years. Defendant acknowledged that he understood the advisement. The court accepted his plea and set the matter for sentencing.
Before the sentencing hearing, defendant filed a motion in which he argued that under the version of § 42-4-1301(9)(a)(II) enacted in Colo. Sess. Laws 2001, ch. 229, at 789 (Senate Bill 01-168), the maximum sentence for vehicular homicide was one year in the county jail. Relying in part upon the subsequently amended version of that section enacted in Colo. Sess. Laws 2001, ch. 1 at 2 (2d Extraordinary Session)(Senate Bill 01S2-008), the trial court rejected defendant's argument and sentenced him to six years in the custody of the DOC. This appeal followed.
Defendant contends that under Senate Bill 01-168 he was subject to a maximum possible punishment of one year in the county jail for his vehicular homicide conviction under § 18-3-106(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2002. We disagree.
The interpretation of statutes is a question of law subject to de novo review. Hendricks v. People, 10 P.3d 1231 (Colo. 2000).
In construing a statute, we must ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent, which is to be discerned, when possible, from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. People v. Longoria, 862 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1993). Constructions that defeat the obvious legislative intent should be avoided, and, where possible, a statute must be read and considered as a whole and interpreted to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986). We presume that the General Assembly intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and we will not follow a statutory construction that defeats the legislative intent or leads to an unreasonable or absurd result. People v. Drake, 983 P.2d 135 (Colo. App. 1999).
When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed as written, without resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction. People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234 (Colo. 1994). If, however, the statutory language lends itself to alternative constructions and its intended scope is unclear, a court may apply rules of statutory construction to determine the construction that accords with the objective of the legislation. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1990). If the language of the statute is ambiguous or in conflict with other provisions, we then look to legislative history, prior law, the consequences of a given construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme. People v. Luther, 58 P.3d 1013 (Colo. 2002).
As relevant here, a person commits vehicular hom
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