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DAVIS v. S.C. DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY10/21/1997
The South Carolina Department of Public Safety (Department) appeals from a circuit court order which determined that the plain meaning of the phrase "term of imprisonment" as used in the felony DUI statute denotes "actual duration of the offender's incarceration." Department also appeals the trial court's ruling that multiple convictions arising out of a single violation (such as when more than one individual is harmed by the conduct) of the felony DUI statute result in only one three-year suspension of Davis's driver's license. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 8, 1991, Davis pled guilty to two counts of felony DUI. Both of these counts, on separate indictments, involved one accident, which caused injury to two separate people. On each indictment, Davis was sentenced to five years, suspended on service of two years, a $5000 fine, and five years probation. The fine and sentence on both indictments were concurrent.
Davis completed his sentence of imprisonment on January 16, 1992, and began probation, with an expiration date of
LAW/DISCUSSION
I.
Department contends that the legislative intent under the felony
The statutory language at issue is as follows:
The department shall suspend the driver's license
of any person who is convicted or who receives
sentence upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
pursuant to this section for a period to include any
term of imprisonment plus three years.
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2945 (B) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
The construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be accorded most respectful consideration
We believe Department's interpretation of "term of imprisonment" as including a suspended sentence, probation, or parole is clearly erroneous.
When statutory terms are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction and the terms must be applied according to their literal meaning. Carolina power & Light Co. v. City of Bennettsville, 314 S.C. 137, 442 S.E.2d 177 (1994). We believe the phrase "term of imprisonment" clearly and unambiguously refers to physical incarceration and, therefore, the subsequent three-year suspension should begin when a defendant is released from incarceration in a correctional institution or similar facility. See State v. Wickenhauser, 309 S.C. 377, 423 S.E.2d 344 (1992) (term "imprisonment" as used in S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2940 (4) refers only to actual incarceration and not to any probationary period). Other jurisdictions have likewise determined that "term of imprisonment" as used in various statutes refers to actual physical confinement in jail. E.g., Otterstetter v. McManus, 243 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1976) ("term of imprisonment" as used in Interstate Agreement on Detainers refers to physical confinement of the prisoner and not parole); Pennsylvania v. Kriston, 588 A.2d 898, 899 (Pa. 1991) (holding "plain and ordinary meaning of imprisonment is confinement in a correctional or similar rehabilitative institution," not electronic home monitoring) (emphasis in original). But cf. New Jersey v. Rosado, 621 A.2d 12, 14 (N.J. 1993) (" arole is the legal equivalent of imprisonment — a proposition that we adopt for purposes of computing credit for a `term of imprisonment' in the context of this case.").
Because the phrase "term of imprisonment" is clear and unambiguous, discerning legislative intent is not necessary. See Timmons v. South Carolina Tricentennial Comm'n, 254 S.C. 378, 401, 175 S.E.2d 805, 817 (1970) ("If a statute is clear and explicit in its language, then there is no need to resort to statutory interpretation or legislative intent to determ
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