 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
PETERSEN v. STATE12/20/1996
t-degree stalking under either AS 11.41.260(a)(1) or 260(a)(2) — the provisions that speak to acts of stalking committed while the defendant is under a court order or a parole condition that prohibits the defendant from having contact with the other person in the first place. The defendants in the present appeals do not challenge the constitutionality of domestic violence restraining orders or the constitutionality of no-contact orders imposed as a condition of bail, probation, or parole. Nor have the defendants suggested any reason to believe that the constitution forbids the legislature from enacting a criminal statute that addresses a defendant's repeated knowing violations of a no-contact order.
Of the three present appeals, two involve defendants who were convicted of first-degree stalking under AS 11.41.260(a)(1) or (a)(2). Both Petersen and Colbry were under court orders not to have contact with their victims. The facts of Colbry's case do not raise the issue of knowing encounters in public places; Colbry was charged with stalking for committing physical assaults on his victim and for making a series of threatening
telephone calls to her. However, some of the acts charged against Petersen consisted of approaching R.H. in public places. Because of this, the existence of no-contact orders is significant in Petersen's case.
One of Petersen's conditions of probation from his April 1992 trespass conviction prohibited him from going to R.H.'s residence. This prohibition was broadened when, in April 1993, Petersen was convicted of assault for attempting to ram R.H.'s car. In Petersen's conditions of probation from the 1993 assault case, he was ordered to have no contact at all with R.H., "including not being within one block of her places of employment or residence". Despite this no-contact order, Petersen confronted R.H. as she entered a grocery store in May 1993, he confronted and yelled at R.H. at the Regal Alaskan Hotel in June 1993, he approached "within touching distance" of R.H. at the Bear Paw Festival in July 1993, and he was finally arrested one week later after a police officer found him in R.H.'s driveway. Peterson was convicted of violating AS 11.41.260(a)(2): stalking when the acts constituting the offense were also violations of a condition of probation.
Because Peterson was under court order to have no contact with his victim, and because he does not challenge the lawfulness of this condition of probation, we conclude that Petersen had no constitutional right to knowingly approach or follow R.H., even in public places or at public events. Even if these portions of the definition of stalking might be unconstitutionally broad when applied generally, Petersen was under a no-contact order, and the State's proof of this additional element in Petersen's case means that he has no claim.
Colbry, like Petersen, was under a court order not to contact his victim. Moreover, even if the stalking statutes posed constitutional problems with respect to public encounters, these problems would not affect Colbry's case. The acts of nonconsensual contact charged against Colbry were not public encounters, but rather physical assaults and threatening telephone calls.
Defendant Larson's case is distinguishable from Petersen's and Colbry's because Larson was convicted of second-degree stalking; the State did not assert that Larson's conduct violated any court order or parole condition. Thus, in Larson's case we must address the contention that the definition of stalking is unconstitutional because it allows a person to be prosecuted for encountering someone else in a public place when that other person does not wish to have contact with him.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Alaska DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|