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PETERSEN v. STATE12/20/1996
he defendants are not trivial. As we noted at the beginning of this section, the stalking statutes' definition of "nonconsensual contact" covers a wide spectrum of social interaction. This definition is undoubtedly the Alaska Legislature's most comprehensive codification of a person's right to be free from unwanted contact. Yet even though our society values and protects individual autonomy and privacy, our society at the same time recognizes a person's right to engage in uncomfortable, distasteful, and annoying contacts — even abrasive confrontations — with other citizens. Such interactions are not merely tolerated; they are explicitly protected by our Constitution.
However, the Constitution does not guarantee a right to threaten other people. When a person's words or actions constitute an assault — when they cause other people to reasonably fear for their own safety or the safety of those close to them — the Constitution no longer provides a refuge. We conclude that Alaska's stalking statutes are constitutional because, in essence, they outlaw assaultive conduct. To establish the crime of stalking, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly engaged in repeated acts of nonconsensual contact, the government must prove that these nonconsensual contacts placed another person in fear of injury or death, and the government must prove that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for this result. Because these elements must be proved, the Alaska stalking statutes do not, on their face, prohibit constitutionally protected speech or conduct.
As we indicated above, the stalking statutes may present difficult constitutional questions in particular hypothetical situations. However, the conduct of the defendants in these three appeals falls within the core of the statutory definition — assaultive conduct with no constitutional justification. We therefore reject the defendants' challenges to the statute.
Defendants Larson and Colbry present no issues on appeal except the constitutionality of the definition of stalking. We therefore affirm their convictions. Defendant Petersen
raises other issues, which we address in the next section of this opinion.
Other Issues Raised by Petersen
At Petersen's trial, the State introduced evidence detailing Petersen's and R.H.'s interactions from the time Petersen began receiving massage therapy from R.H. in 1989. Petersen argues that the State should not have been permitted to introduce evidence of any events that occurred before May 28, 1993, the effective date of the stalking statutes. See ch. 40, § 9 SLA 1993. He contends that these pre-May 1993 contacts were "other bad acts" that should have been excluded under Evidence Rules 403 and 404(b).
We disagree. The State was obliged to prove that Petersen knowingly engaged in nonconsensual contact with R.H.. Obviously, R.H.'s reaction to Petersen's pre-May 1993 contacts (in particular, her explicit directions to Petersen that he stay away from her) were relevant to prove that Petersen was aware that R.H. did not consent to his post-May 1993 contacts with her.
Additionally, the State was obliged to prove that R.H. was placed in fear of injury or death by Petersen's post-May 1993 contacts. Clearly, evidence of Petersen's longstanding course of conduct toward R.H. — his persistent refusal to stay away from her, his repeated presence at her workplace, his middle-of-the-night trespass at her home in January 1992, and his attempt to ram R.H.'s car in January 1993 — was relevant to establish that R.H. feared injury or death at Petersen's hands.
Finally, the State was obliged to prove that Petersen recklessly disregarded a su
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