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PETERSEN v. STATE12/20/1996
s (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the statute provide a limiting definition of the phrase, "course of conduct":
In this section, "course of conduct" means repeated acts of nonconsensual contact involving the victim or a family member[.] . . . " onconsensual contact" means any contact with another person that is initiated or continued without that person's consent, that is beyond the scope of the consent provided by that person, or that is in disregard of that person's expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued; "nonconsensual contact" includes
(A) following or appearing within the sight of that person;
(B) approaching or confronting that person in a public place or on private property;
(C) appearing at the workplace or residence of that person;
(D) entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by that person;
(E) contacting that person by telephone;
(F) sending mail or electronic communications to that person;
(G) placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased or occupied by that person[.]
This is the basic definition of the crime. This conduct, by itself, constitutes second-degree stalking. The offense becomes first-degree stalking under AS 11.41.260(a) if the actions constituting the stalking were in violation of a domestic violence restraining order, see 260(a)(1), or were in violation of a condition of probation, parole, or bail, see 260(a)(2); or if the victim was under age 16, see 260(a)(3); or if the defendant possessed a deadly weapon during the stalking, see 260(a)(4); or if the defendant had previously been convicted of either stalking or violating a domestic violence restraining order, see 260(a)(5); or if the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more of the assaultive crimes listed in 260(a)(6) involving the same victim.
In the present appeals, the defendants assert that the statutory definition of stalking is unconstitutionally "vague". However, their primary argument is that the statute criminalizes "innocent behavior protected by rights of association and the freedom a citizen [possesses] to go about his daily behavior". [Peterson's opening brief, p. 18] Properly understood, this is a substantive due process claim or an overbreadth claim rather than a vagueness claim.
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if its wording is so imprecise "that people of common intelligence would be relegated to differing guesses about its meaning". Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 632, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2497, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). Such a statute offends constitutional values in two major ways: by failing to give people "adequate notice of the conduct that is prohibited", and by placing a power of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement in the hands of police, prosecutors, and ultimately judges and juries. Summers v. Anchorage, 589 P.2d 863, 866-67 (Alaska 1979).
The defendants do level a cursory vagueness attack on a few of the terms used in the definition of stalking. The defendants assert in conclusory fashion, without providing any supporting argument or citation to legal authority, that the terms "follow" and "approach", as well as the phrase "appear within the sight of", are all too vague to be understood by people of common intelligence.
The stalking statutes require the State to prove that the defendant acted knowingly. We believe that people of common intelligence would readily understand the meaning of "knowingly follow another person", "knowingly approach another person", and "knowingly appear within the sight of another person". See State v. Culmo, 43 Conn. Sup. 46,
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