 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Eibergen v. Killens11/19/1996
ncentration of .08 or more within a relevant time after the driving . . . ." Because petitioner was found to have a blood alcohol content of .15 when he was arrested in Orange County, his driver's license was subject to immediate revocation. Nevertheless, petitioner contends that because he did not have his driver's license card with him at the time and because no affidavit in this regard was filed by the magistrate, his driver's license was not validly revoked on 25 May 1994. We disagree. The ten day revocation of petitioner's license took effect immediately upon the issuance of the magistrate's order, even though petitioner stated he did not have his driver's license card with him and even though the magistrate filed no affidavit.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(17)(1993) defines "license" as
Any driver's license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under or granted by the laws of this State including: (a) Any temporary license or learner's permit; (b) The privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license ; and (c) Any nonresident's operating privilege.
(Emphasis added). The term "license" encompasses more than the license card itself; it includes the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State. In addition, "revocation or suspension" is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(36)(1993) as "termination of a licensee's or permittee's privilege to drive . . . ." Thus, when a person's driver's license is suspended or revoked, it is the surrendering of the privilege to drive, not the license card itself, that is of significance. If revocation could become effective only when a licensee elected to turn in his or her driver's license card, the intent of the legislature and the purpose of the statute would be frustrated.
Finally, according to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5(e)(1993), if the revocation report is filed with the judicial official when the person is present, "unless the person is not currently licensed, the revocation under this subsection begins at the time the revocation order is issued and continues until the person's license has been suspended for ten days and the person has paid the applicable costs." (Emphasis added). Therefore, petitioner's license was revoked at the time he was operating a motor vehicle in Alamance County on 26 May 1994, and the Alamance County charge constituted a moving violation during a period of license suspension.
The evidence in the record before us supports respondent's revocation of petitioner's license pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-28.1(b)(1) for the commission of a moving violation during a period when his driver's license was revoked. The judgment of the Alamance County Superior Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges EAGLES and MCGEE concur.
|